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This paper analyzes the ongoing development of regionalism in greater East Asian region. Since 
the late 1990s, there has been much progress on forming an East Asian Community. The author 
argues that the 1997 East Asian Financial Crisis was a crucial point in this process, providing a 
strong sense of “We-ness” in East Asia. Many Asian nations felt abandoned by the U.S. at that 
time, and they decided to come together to hedge against further financial security risks. The 
economic and political rationale behind creating this regional community is clear. The concept of 
East Asian Community can both stimulate economic prosperity and maintain peace in East Asia 
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East Asia’s particular geographical composition has been highly contested. No single map of 
East Asia is inherently self-evident as to preclude other equally plausible options. The term is 
highly fluid and it is subject to redefinition and reconfiguration. Different geographical 
groupings are used to advance or hinder specific political goals. In this paper, I employ the term 
“East Asia” to be composed of the nation-states of Northeast and Southeast Asia – China, Japan, 
North and South Korea, Taiwan, and the ten ASEAN member states (Myanmar, Vietnam, 
Cambodia, Laos, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Singapore). This 
configuration of the region illuminates certain amount of ongoing economic cooperation as the 
technology, capital-rich Northeast Asia cooperates with labor-rich and capital-poor Southeast 
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1.1. East Asian Regionalism under the framework of ASEAN+3 
“We recognize the bright prospects for enhanced interaction and closer linkages in East Asia 
and the fact that this growing interaction has helped increase opportunities for cooperation and 
collaboration with each other.” 
 
Joint statement by the leaders of South East Asian countries, China, Japan and South Korea,  
Nov. 28, 1999 - Manila, Philippines. 
 
A Korean scholar, An Jung-geun, already envisioned the concept of an East Asian 
Community actively pursued by the ASEAN+3 forum exactly 100 years ago from 2010. In 1910, 
An was executed by the Japanese colonial authority for the crime of assassinating the first Prime 
Minister of Japan, Ito Hirobumi. As a Korean independence activist, he decided to kill the main 
political figure behind forcing Korea’s submission as a protectorate of Imperial Japan via the 
Eulsa Treaty. Above all things, An was also a pan-Asianist who envisioned the collaboration 
among China, Korea, and Japan to repel the European colonialism rampant in Asia at that time. 
Until his death in March 26, 1910, An worked hard on theorizing a model for Pan-Asianism in 
his essay, “On Peace in East Asia.” In recent years, there have been multiple events both in 
Korea and Japan in anticipation of the upcoming centenary of his martyrdom. Kim young-ho, the 
director of the International East Asian Community Scholarly Association, spoke about An to 
five hundred Japanese influential figures gathered at the Asahi Shimbun’s conference hall in 
Tokyo:
         
 2 
“I want to introduce An Jung-geun not as a hero of the Korean independence movement but as a 
East Asian pacifist, or rather, the ‘Jean Monet,’ the father of European integration, of the 
construction of an East Asian community.”
1
  
According to Kim, An Jung-geun’s proposal for East Asian peaceful cooperation was 
groundbreaking, as it possessed a comprehensive model for peaceful regional cooperation some 
70 years before the creation of the European Communities. Some of his ideas were so 
revolutionary to the extent that they still have currency in contemporary East Asia. His ideas 
were: making Ryojun neutral, as it was internationally disputed territory; establishing Asian 
Peace Conference’s headquarters in that disputed territory of Ryojun; building a joint security 
regime operated by a joint peace force after disbanding the national armies; cooperating with 
each other towards common industrial development; issuing a common currency through a 
regional development bank. The latter two ideas ultimately became an early form of the 
initiatives currently under discussion today, including an Asian Monetary Fund and an Asian 
Currency Unit.
2
 An’s vision of the Asian Peace Conference is especially interesting. He 
proposed the conference to be organized and led by regular citizens, not government 
representatives, of Korea, China, Japan, and the nations of Southeast Asia. He emphasized that 
citizen participation in the movement towards regionalism can help distinguish between states 
and their peoples, which can eventually benefit everyone in the region not just the political 
figureheads. 
The international balance of economic power is increasingly shifting towards Asia, the 
home of one-third of the world’s population and one-fifth of its gross domestic product (GDP). 
                                                 
1
 The Hankyoreh Newspaper, “East Asian Community and An Jung-geun,” editorial, March 25, 2008, translated 




Impressive growth rates registered by China, India, and South East Asian countries along with 
rapidly increasing intra-regional trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) show that a historic 
transfer of power is taking place.  
According to a 2008 IMF report, intra-regional trade within emerging Asia increased by 
8½ times between 1990 and 2006 while trade volume in the rest of the world roughly tripled.
3
 As 
a result, trade between the economies in emerging Asia has risen steadily from about 30 percent 
of total exports by the region in 1990 to more than 40 percent in 2006. It was the Plaza Accord of 
1985 that stimulated a strong wave of intra-regional investment and trade in East Asia.
4
 Facing 
huge appreciation of yen, Japanese firms led the way to set up extensive and sophisticated 
production facilities in Southeast Asia (later in newly industrialized economies such as South 
Korea and Taiwan) to reduce input costs and remain competitive in the market. Multinational 
corporations based on other countries also started to break their processing facilities into 
different parts of Asia according to available national factor proportions and technological 
capabilities.
5
 This business scheme generated a dense web of intraregional trade networks in 
manufacturing and banking sectors across East Asia, enhancing the bottom-up connectedness 
among the regional economies. 
Since late 1990s, there has been a surge of governmental force to further this de facto 
economic integration induced by “markets…, private trade and investment flows, and the 
policies and decision of companies.”
6
 Why in that period? I argue that shared concern among 
East Asian states reached a new level in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The 
                                                 
3
 Gruenwald, Paul and Hori, Masahiro, “Intra-regional Trade Key to Asia's Export Boom,” IMF Survey Magazine, 
IMF Asia-Pacific Department, February 6, 2008, accessed via 
<http://imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2008/CAR02608A.htm>. 
4
 East Asia refers to Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. 
5
 Gill, Indermit Singh, and Huang, Yukon. And Kharas, Homi J., and Qun Bandhmuniratn. And World Bank and 
Institute of Policy Studies (Singapore) East Asian visions: perspectives on economic development, 2007, p. 32 
6
 T.J. Pempel, Editor, Remapping of East Asia: The construction of a region, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY 
(2005), pp. 19. 
 4 
financial crisis constituted a “turning point” in elevating East Asian regionalism to a new level as 
countries realized the need for regional economic collaboration to provide financial security for 
crisis prevention, management, and recovery. The 1997 crisis was the perfect apparatus in taking 
a big step towards institutionalizing the dream of “East Asian community.” In November 1999, 
the ASEAN +3 (China, Japan, and Korea) Summit released the Joint Statement on East Asian 
Cooperation that outlined a wide range of possible areas for regional cooperation.  
The abovementioned 1999 joint declaration by thirteen Asian leaders was a ground-
breaking agreement to accelerate the development of an organization promoting political, 
economic and cultural cooperation in East Asia under the framework of the ASEAN +3 (APT) – 
composed of ten member states of Association of South East Asian Nations plus China, Japan, 
and South Korea. Unlike the existing de facto international arrangements for integration such as 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), APT is special for its concentration in East 
Asian affair functioning outside the umbrella of the U.S. military power and political leadership. 
It is also the most ambitious and comprehensive of the governmental efforts to establish an 
institutional framework that could help further the on-the-ground economic network in the region 
and cope with future crisis similar to the 1997 Asian Financial crisis. The negotiation of financial 
and trade policies is currently on the regional agenda. As of now, the ASEAN+3 is seen as “the 
most active regional grouping outside Europe, boasting an institutional structure increasingly 
akin to G7 and already more sophisticated than NAFTA.”
7
 High-level political support shown by 
various summits along with step-by-step procedure with far-reaching ambitions, make the 
initiative to have “the potential to become the dominant regional institution in East Asia”
8
 APT 
functions as a series of meetings at three levels: the first involving the heads of government; the 
                                                 
7
 Zhang, Yumei, Pacific Asia: the politics of development, Routledge, New York: 2002, pp. 142. 
8
 “Between Regionalism and Regionalization,” in Remapping of East Asia: The construction of a region, 2005, pp. 
201   
 5 
second involving ministerial-level meetings of economic and finance ministers; the third 
involves senior officials from ministries and agencies, including science and technology groups. 
At its embryonic stage, APT is promoting the pragmatic, economic interest-based cooperation, 
namely the East Asian Free Trade Agreement (EAFTA) that would encompass one third of the 
world’s population. In the future, it will attempt to be the vehicle for deeper integration 
structured on some kind of “community” basis, cooperating on areas such as environmental 
protection, human security, cultural and personal exchanges, energy conservation, education and 
research, etc.  
My thesis analyzes the ongoing development of regional integration in greater East Asian 
region. I pay special attention to the state-led efforts pushing forward for an “East Asian 
Community (EAC)” under the framework of ASEAN+3. My thesis attempts to address the 
following questions, and hope to illuminate the interplay of national and regional forces in East 
Asia that currently experience a historical moment:  
 
1. What forces motivated the growing economic integration in East Asia before the 1997 
financial crisis?  
2. What role did 1997 Asian financial crisis have in instigating political will among East 
Asian states to promote the vision of an EAC? What are the possible economic benefits 
of forming an EAC? 
3. How did political reality before the 1997 obstruct building of an EAC, and how did 
forces of regional integration gradually overcome those political barriers? 
4. What is the role of the United States in East Asian regionalism? 
5. How did the EAC framework develop recently? What are some recommendations to 
further the ongoing process of East Asian integration?  
 
1.2. Regionalism  
a. Definition and Explanation of Different Levels/Forms of Regionalism 
 6 
Regionalism is a term used in international affairs and the commercial system. In its 
broad sense, regionalism refers to an expression of common sense of identity or purpose through 
a conscious policy of states or nongovernmental actions to coordinate activities and 
arrangements in a greater region.
9
 In its specific use in international economics, regionalism can 
also refer to the “creation of intergovernmental institutions designed to promote economic 
integration by liberalizing or facilitating trade or other forms of cross-border economic activities 
within a region.”
10
 Various forms of regionalism require different levels of commitment. An 
FTA between two countries in the same region is considered a ‘solid regionalism’ with binding 
rule of law. On the other hand, consultative bodies are not legally binding in nature, and are 
considered a looser form of regionalism. Among the forms of legally enforced regionalism, there 
are five stages of regional economic integration ranging from shallow to deep level: preferential 
trade agreements, free-trade area, custom union, common market, and economic union.
11
 The 
first three stages are considered “shallow integration” stages as they attempt to establish low 
level of trade barriers among member countries via policies like providing preference to trading 
partners, eliminating tariffs and quantitative restriction. Examples include ASEAN FTA and 
North American Free Trade Area. The last two stages are characterized as “deep integration.” 
Each stage respectively represents promoting free movements of factors of production and 
integrating national economic policies and a common currency. Most notable example includes 
the European Union.   
Regional integration in the global economy has been on the rise from the 1990s onwards. 
Countries began to realize that building cooperative regional and multilateral institutions is an 
                                                 
9
 “Regionalism and world economic order,” in Regionalism in World Politics, edited by Louis Fawcett and Andrew 
Hurrell (Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 77-80. 
10
 Munakata, Naoko. Transforming East Asia: The Evolution of Regional Economic Integration. Washington D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2006, pp. 189 
11
 Das, Kilip K., Regionalism in Global Trade. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2004, pp. 15 
 7 
effective way to overcome complex global economic and trade realities. The regionalization of 
world trade operating simultaneously with advancing global integration, particularly trade in 
goods and services, has attracted much scholarly attention. Many theories were born out to 
measure the progress of regional integration and the proliferation of Regional Integration 
Agreements (RIA) in the background of globalization. Neo-liberalism argues that increasing 
interdependence creates demand for more integration. Integration efforts primarily come from 
state elites in a ‘top-down’ manner. Cooperation occurs to the extent that it can solve problems 
arising from interdependence and/or produce direct economic or other benefits from it.
12
 Neo-
functionalism envisions regional integration to be a ‘bottom-up’ process involving mostly 
technical experts and business groups cooperating in relatively non-controversial areas. 
Cooperation proceeds in an incremental fashion, eventually moving beyond the private technical 
areas to high politics governed by interest groups and political parties. Finally, inter-
governmentalism argues that integration is the result of a process of bargaining between state 
leaders. Thus depending on the bargaining preferences, integration is more likely to proceed in 
sudden vigorous manner than the smooth incremental fashion envisioned by neo-functionalism.
13
  
In addition to the conditions described by major theoretical approaches, several other 
conditions are important for regional integration. One is geographic compactness. States that are 
close together are more likely to share common interests and take advantage of trading and other 
collaborative opportunities. Another condition for successful integration efforts is relative 
symmetry in capabilities (military, political, and economic) among prospective members. The 
logic is that states with approximately equal power will be better able to form greater cooperative 
arrangements. Other analysts indicate that projected stability in the distribution of those 
                                                 
12
 Lee, Pho Ping, Tham, Siew Yean & Yu, George T. (eds.) The Emerging East Asian Community: Security & 
Economic Issues. Penerbit UKM: Bangi, 2006, pp. 41 
13
 Ibid. pp. 42 
 8 
capabilities over time is more relevant than simple comparison of relative capabilities among 
prospective members.
14
 All these conditions have contributed to the proliferation of regional 
institutions on the ground or in study. Such institutions include European Union, Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA), NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC), the Central American Common Market (CACM), the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM), and the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), etc.
15
 
b. Development of Regionalism in the East Asian Context  
Generally, East Asian regionalism has been following the trajectory envisioned by neo-
functionalism as the region became economically integrated through a ‘bottom-up’ process 
involving proliferating number of non-governmental, mostly business, cooperation in the region. 
Despite being one of the three ‘mega-regions’ (Europe, North America, and East Asia), in which 
most of the world’s production, trade and investment is concentrated, ‘top-bottom’ process of 
regionalism involving government initiatives only started in the late 1990s after the 1997 
financial crisis. Relative to other regions, East Asian governments were slow and late in adopting 
the concept and phenomenon of regionalism while enterprises were quick to arrange a series of 
activities that enhanced regional economic integration. There is one exception in this paradigm: 
Japan-led Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere during the 1930s and 40s. Japanese imperial 
state during the World War II was much devoted to establishing an exploitative trade networks 
linking Japan and other Asian economies in order to acquire natural resources for the war efforts. 
As the self-designated leader of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japan promised 
economic development and industrialization to other East Asian countries to face the Western 
colonial powers. However, the Japanese scheme of Pan-Asian unity was soon debunked as a 
                                                 
14
 Ibid. pp. 43 
15
 FAOSTAT (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), Concepts & Definitions, 
http://faostat.fao.org/site/374/default.aspx  
 9 
myth. Instead of providing assistance and pursuing mutual development, Japan took over other 
Asian local economies, extracted local natural resources, and exploited native labor resulting in 
death toll of millions of Asian civilians due to fighting, atrocities, disastrous labor and economic 
policies, and the starvation and disease that followed.
16
 
After the Second World War, however, Japan achieved remarkable economic growth 
from the 1950s to the 1980s thanks to the export-driven development strategy. Japan first began 
by exporting labor-intensive products like textiles. Gradually, the composition of exports 
changed through technological progression, including heavy industrial goods, complex 
machinery and equipment, and consumer durables that require large capital and advanced 
technology. Japanese government policies played a large role in encouraging the export of higher 
value goods, providing positive feedback effect of greater industrialization. Some of those 
policies were: 
1. Compulsory saving deductions – it curtailed consumption and yielded high rates of 
saving.  
 
2. Investment in strategic industries – substantial amounts of saving were channeled into 
industries such as iron and steel, autos, shipbuilding and semiconductors that have large 
technological spillover effects.  
 
3. Export and import growth – the growth in exports generated revenue in foreign currency, 
which allowed Japan to import capital goods and technology from abroad. 
 
4. Public and private capital – allocation of capital was primarily through the banking 
system with government guarantees of high debt levels in major industries. 
 
5. Cozy insider relations between business and government – the government set up export 




                                                 
16
 Dower, John W. War Without Mercy: Race and Power In the Pacific War. 7
th
 printing, corr. by the author, New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1993, c.1986, pp. 7. 
17




Japan’s export-oriented growth model had substantial impact on structural transformation 
of the newly industrialized Asian economies (NIAEs),
18
 four members in the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN-4),
19
 and the People’s Republic of China (hereafter China). 
These countries had learned much from Japan’s economic miracle and adopted similar yet 
localized version of Japanese economic policies in their homelands. However, the real beginning 
of regional economic integration occurred after the Plaza Accord
20
 in September 1985. A new 
division of labor among East Asian countries arose when the yen appreciated sharply against 
dollar by 40 percent between 1985 and 1987 due to the Plaza communiqué. The yen’s dramatic 
rise in short period of time compelled many Japanese companies to move their factories offshore 
so that they could cut production costs by taking advantage of cheap labor and remain 
competitive in the U.S. market. Japanese companies set up production networks first in NIAEs, 
then in ASEAN-4 countries and China, leading to brisk expansion of intra-regional trade and 
investment.  According to Dilip K. Das (2004), this phenomenon is explained by the “flying 
geese hypothesis.” He describes:  
It implies a more developed economy aiding and stimulating economic growth in the less 
developed ones, which in turn aids and stimulates growth in the even less developed 
economies, in the process making a functional chain of leader-follower economies. Generally 
there will be one leader economy and several follower ones at various strata of economic 
development, providing an imagery of flying geese. Asian economic development followed 
                                                 
18
 Hong Kong SAR, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. 
19
 Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. 
20
 On 22 September 1985, the Group of Five (G-5, United States, Germany, Japan, France, and the United Kingdom) 
finance ministers and central bankers met at the Plaza Hotel in New York and called for the appreciation of the yen 
and the deutsche mark, instead of the depreciation of the dollar. The Plaza communiqué had a substantial short-term 
impact over the foreign exchange markets and the dollar went into a steep decline, while the yen and deutsche mark 
began to appreciate, the former sharply (Das, 2004, Regionalism in global trade, p. 168)  
 11 
this paradigm, where the Japanese economy was the lead economy, followed by the NIAEs 




The so-called “flying geese” paradigm remained a major boost for pan-Asian economic 
growth for decades. Economic linkages and interdependence in the region have grown 
considerably since the mid-1980s. The 2001 value of intra-regional trade in East Asia was $722 
billion, or 48.2 percent of total Asian trade.
22
 Changes in currency value configuration in 1985 
led to building of extensive intra-regional production/investment network, and ultimately to the 
bottom-up market-driven economic regionalism in East Asia. However, despite of the large-scale 
on-the-ground economic networks, East Asian governmental efforts towards regional economic 
integration did not arise until the aftermath of 1997 financial crisis. What prompted the sudden 
surge of political will towards East Asian institutional arrangement after that particular incident?  
In the following chapter, in regards to the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis, I will address this 










                                                 
21
 Das, p. 168 
22
 Das, Dilip K. (2005) “Market-Driven Regionalization in Asia,” Global Economy Journal: Vol. 5: Iss. 3, Article 2. 
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2.  Economic Needs Realized in the post-crisis East Asia  
 The Asian Financial Crisis and the Global Financial Crisis played an important role in 
promoting regionalism. In this chapter, I will answer the question: “What has been the effect of 
the financial crisis on East Asia regionalism?” The 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis is the turning 
point for East Asian countries to look at formation of the East Asian Community, which 
replication the European Union and the European Economic Area. This chapter begins with a 
general overview of the causes and extent of the crisis in different East Asian economies, then 
the discussion about the disastrous social, economic impacts of the Asian crisis follows. I 
extensively analyze some key factors of the Asian crisis such as rapid financial liberalization 
headed by the U.S. during 1990s, Washington Consensus, and sudden in/out-flows of foreign 
capital, all leading to huge loss of confidence among international investors in the region. Then, I 
discuss the role of the Global Financial Crisis and economic relationship of China to East Asian 
countries, including the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). 
Though the U.S. finds the establishment of the AIIB as China’s political agenda, the bank further 
strengthens the economic relationship of China to the East Asian countries and to the world.  
2.1. 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis 
It was the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis that provided a prime catalyst for the growth of 
governmental initiatives aiming to further East Asian regional economic cooperation. It was the 
third international financial crisis after two crises affecting Latin America in 1982 and Mexico in 
1994. The Asian crisis spread from Thailand to Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and South 
 13 
Korea, with devastating socio economic consequences at each destination. The sequences of the 










Despite of its terrible economic blow, the Asian financial crisis also illuminated 
economic interconnectedness among ASEAN+3 countries, contributing to the heightened East 
Asian consciousness. The crisis also demonstrated the increasing need for regional approach to 
financial stability since both national and global solution (i.e. the solution by the International 
Monetary Fund) had shortcomings. Individual countries could not mobilize enough resources to 
ward off currency pressure. On the other hand, the IMF took very little account of national 
variations; it simply prescribed one economic recovery model for almost all the affected 
countries (except Malaysia), and it also exacted too high political/social/economic costs for 
giving out its emergency loans. Through combination of these reasons, a strong political will 
towards East Asian regionalism finally arose. The ASEAN+3 grouping became the main 
instrument through which the East Asian consciousness was expressed to help alleviate the crisis 
and to prevent future crisis. 
a. Background  
                                                 
23
 Gregory W. Noble and John Ravenhill, “Cause and Consequences of the Asian Financial Crisis,” in Gregory W. 
Noble and John Ravenhill, eds., The Asian Financial Crisis and the Architecture of Global Finance, ed., Cambridge, 
2000, pp. 1-35. 
 14 
A number of complex factors appear to have contributed to the Asian financial crisis. 
Most diagnoses center on a combination of factors, including overreliance on short-term foreign 
capital, excessive investment in real estate, inadequate financial supervision, and politically 
motivated credit allocations that resulted in a massive non-performing loan problem.
24
 Many 
economists, particularly from the World Bank and the IMF, have pointed out “crony capitalism” 
as the root cause of the Asian crisis. They argue that Asian governments were responsible for 
misguided economic policies such as mismanaging the inflows of capitals, banks rife with 
favoritism and incompetence, lax accounting procedures, allowing massive bad loans to large 
corporations, and a lack of transparency on the parts of banks, corporations, and governments.
25
 
Economists suggest that further liberalization of their financial system is necessary to mend the 
governmental deficiency. However, I argue that the root cause of the crisis was rather hasty 
liberalization of the Asian financial system (particularly in regards to short-term capital inflows) 
that is courted and actively sponsored by the United States, the IMF, and the World Bank with 
their collective commitment to the “Washington Consensus.” The reduction of government-
imposed restrictions on the capital inflow and outflow has put many countries financially 
vulnerable to foreign investment. Liberalization of capital controls lifted limits on foreign 
investment in a country’s financial markets, on direct investment by foreigners in businesses or 
property, and on domestic residents’ investments abroad. Joseph Stiglitz, former Chief 
Economist from the World Bank, concurs with this view regarding the cause of the 1997 crisis as 
he once commented; “the single most important factor leading to the Asian crisis is ‘capital 
                                                 
24
 Richard P. Cronin, "Asian Financial Crisis: An Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy Interests and Options," Congressional 
Research Service Report for Congress, April 23, 1998, at http://www.stimson.org/southeastasia/pdf/98-74f_1998Apr23.pdf (July 
12, 2007). 
25
 Goldstein, Morris, and Institute for International Economics (U.S.) The Asian financial crisis: causes, cures, and 




  Financial liberalization indeed has had many adverse consequences 
for developing countries in Asia by undermining their financial arrangements, institutions, and 
regulation systems.  
The U.S. gradually pushed for opening up foreign countries’ financial market via what is 
called “Washington Consensus,” involving a set of policies aimed at liberalizing international 
financial order. U.S. based finance firms also supported the policies as they expected that profits 
were correlated with higher capital mobility in the world. In addition, both the U.S. Treasury 
Department and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pushed foreign countries to remove their 
restrictions on international borrowing and investing in the rhetoric of trade liberalization and 
government deregulation. They have made claims that financial liberalization would assure high 
economic growth with massive capital inflows into developing countries.
 27
 However, this type 
of short-term inflows rarely contribute to real capital formation and, thus, to economic growth. 
Rather, they contribute to creation of asset market bubbles, mostly in the stock and real property 
markets. Short-term inflows also bring in strong foreign financial interests in the borrowing 
economies, making them susceptible to herd behavior by foreign investors. A significant upsurge 
of foreign assets in regional markets, thus, increases the chances of contagion from abroad.
28
     
Whether the five most affected Asian countries (Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, 
Thailand, and South Korea) have room for political maneuver to avoid the influence of the 
Washington Consensus, it is still debatable. Yet, there is still no doubt that the U.S. at the time 
has enormous power and influence over economic policy of the listed Asian countries through 
the IMF. Quite often the IMF stood as a vanguard of the U.S. interest; the US Treasury 
                                                 
26 Beeson, Mark. Regionalism & Globalization in East Asia: Politics, Security & Economic Development. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007, pp. 210 




Department held (and continues to hold) not only a veto but also an overwhelming dominance 
within the organization – theoretically, Europe and Japan together could outvote the U.S. but 
they have not chosen to do so since its inception in 1944 for fear that any challenge to 
Washington’s dominance in the institution (and the World Bank) might help developing 
countries gaining a voice.
29
 The IMF also exerts its real power through its position as 
“gatekeeper” for official credit, having lots of sway over the international circle of creditors. A 
borrowing country that does not meet IMF conditions will often face hard time borrowing loans 
from the much larger scale, such as the World Bank, regional banks (i.e. Inter-American 
Development Bank), high-income country governments including those belonging to the Paris 
Club, and sometimes even the private sector.
30
 Thus, the Asian countries experienced 
tremendous political pressure to adhere to the “suggestions” given by the IMF before the crisis. 
 The decision to liberalize financial sectors throughout 1990s turned out to be a reckless 
one as proven by statistics such as ratio of foreign liabilities to foreign assets, non-performing 
loans, and contribution of inward foreign direct investment to current account financing. All of 
the indicators pointed towards the rise in purely speculative capital in the Asian countries; such 
capital termed as “hot money” – extremely volatile short-term capital that moved on a short 
notice to any country providing better returns – tended to enter the country in massive quantity 
when economies were growing thereby contributing to economic bubble and artificial aura of 
success, and tended to exit very quickly on a mere suspicion of a downturn or other negative 
factor, causing a near collapse of the country’s financial structure.
31
 In the pre-crisis period, high 
GDP growth in many Asian countries was the result of both increase in exports and large inflow 
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of those speculative foreign capitals due to lax regulation of the financial market. Then the 
bubble burst, where all the capital flew out of the Asian countries as fast as it once flowed in. 
The trigger for the massive capital flight was rooted upon heavy short-term international 
borrowing of the five Asian countries. South Korea’s government, for example, removed a 
number of restrictions on foreign ownership of domestic stocks and bonds, residents' ownership 
of foreign assets, and overseas borrowing by domestic financial and non-financial institutions as 
part of financial liberalization.
32
 Korea's foreign debt nearly tripled from $44 billion in 1993 to 
$120 billion in September 1997. The short-term percentage of the loan reached the country’s 
record high at 67.9 percent by mid-1997.
33
  For comparison, the average ratio of short-term to 
total debt for non-OPEC less developed countries at the time of the 1980s debt crisis (1980-82) 
was twenty percent.
34
 Other countries faced similar vulnerabilities. Indonesia piled up $39.7 
billion of debt by mid 1997, 87 percent of which was short-term.
35
 As the crisis loomed over, the 
five countries had a combined debt to foreign banks of $274 billion, with about sixty-four 
percent in short-term obligations.
36
  
The high percentage of short-term debt relative to reserves invited much panic among 
investors when the Asian countries’ economic growth slowed down. In order to serve the debts, 
people sold their domestic currency to get dollar or other “hard” currencies; a resulting 
depreciation of the domestic currency led to even higher costs of debt service. This situation 
especially became dangerous when there was a “rush” for the capital exits as more and more 
investors converted the domestic currency and asset into dollars. The reserve shrank further in 
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order to meet the rising demand, which then sent signals to currency speculators about the 
expected fall in the currency value. Thus, the downward spiral continued as the domestic 
currency value against dollar plummeted and foreign lenders refused to renew the short-term 
loans. Capital flight intensified as more and more investors lose confidence in the country, 
leading to currency and stock market crash.  
b. Impact 
The Asian financial crisis was unfolded in the sequences mentioned above, first starting 
in Thailand. In the beginning of 1997, a large number of Thai financial institutions failed to pay 
some of their short-term borrowings invested in development projects for various attraction sites 
and real estate markets, where government bailouts were expected.
37
 Thai government relied on 
its reserves to take up some of these loans, leading many currency speculators to bet against the 
Thai baht; they knew that Thai government would eventually have to devalue Baht as the efforts 
to maintain the currency peg to dollar would surely result in reserve draining. By June of that 
year, that speculation came into reality. The Bank of Thailand used approximately $28 billion 
out of its $30 billion international reserves to defend the value of the baht in the course of 
forward market interventions.
38
 On 02 July, Baht was 18 percent devalued in one day, causing 
investors to lose confidence in Thailand’s economy. Investors suddenly lowered their valuation 
of all the assets of Thailand, leading to an even sharper fall in the Thai exchange rate. The baht 
reached the bottom at 48.80 baht per dollar in December of the same year, the highest rate 
(lowest value of the Thai baht) ever since Thailand started keeping record in 1969.
39
 Thailand’s 
cratered economy quickly spread financial instability and political turmoil from Indonesia to 
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South Korea. Many currency speculators bet heavily against many Asian currencies with 
exchange rates linked to the U.S. dollar, and as a result they indirectly triggered herd-like 
behavior of foreign investors; massive capital flights from the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
and South Korea followed.  
On 11 July 1997, nine days after the Thai baht collapsed, Manila gave in. The Philippine 
peso was devalued by 4 percent; increasing import prices and much fall in domestic demand. 
Eventually the stock market went down 22 percent.
40
  
Malaysian economy followed the suit. It surrendered on 14 July as the ringgit plunged to 
a 33-month low, even after the central bank tried its best to safeguard the currency by jacking up 
interest rates to 50 percent and spending almost $1 billion from its foreign reserves. Lamented 
Malaysian Finance Minister Anwar Ibrahim stated, "there's a limit to what we can do."
41
 
Indonesia's rupiah also fell to a record low of 2,471 to the U.S. dollar.
42
  
The crisis then spread to a Northeast Asian country of South Korea. The South Korean 
won depreciated by 68.25 percent in 1997 against the U.S. dollar. Korea’s stock market also 
suffered severely during the Asian financial crisis, falling by 7 percent in November 8, 1997, the 
biggest one-day drop ever recorded there to date; by the end of 1997, it fell to low 42.62 percent 
from the height of 1996 data.
43
  
Relatively a minor currency crisis in Thailand had wide-range spillover effects across 
East Asia via contagion effects; the herd-like behavior beset by the period of financial turmoil in 
foreign exchange markets led many foreign investors to panic and set the capital flight in motion 
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out of Asia. In Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Korea, a positive net inflow of 
over US$92.8 billion in 1996 quickly turned into a negative net outflow of over $12.1 billion in 
1997. This $105 billion turnout in less than a year represented about 11 percent of the total GDP 
of the five countries.
44
 Rapid capital outflows resulted in further currency devaluations and stock 
market crashes. Economic instability led to negative GDP and wage growth along with soaring 
inflation and unemployment, and eventually a severe economic recession. For example, in a 
matter of months, the number of unemployed workers increased by over 800,000 in Indonesia, 
1.5 million in Thailand, and about 1.35 million in South Korea. As currency values plummeted, 
people's effective wages also dropped. By the end of 1998, real wages had dropped by 12.5 
percent in South Korea and by 6 percent in Thailand.
45
  
c. Post-Crisis Recovery Efforts 
Negative views about the merits of IMF crisis-management policies dominated much of 
East Asian sphere in the aftermath of the crisis. The IMF emphasized the internal factors as the 
main cause of the crisis, criticizing the ‘crony capitalism’ and ‘corruption’ of the affected 
countries. In this line of thinking, the IMF and the Treasury Department overlooked the actual 
cause of the crisis, which was the liquidity problem; the IMF could have restored confidence 
among foreign investors and stabilized the currency market in the crisis-hit countries if it 
provided enough currency reserves to the affected economies.
46
 In September 1997, when it was 
still early enough to avoid much of upcoming financial disaster, Japan proposed the creation of 
an “Asian Monetary Fund” to provide much needed emergency liquidity to faltering East Asian 
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economies. Other Asian countries endorsed the proposal and total combined endowment up to 
$100 billion was supported by Japan, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. However, after 
staunch opposition from the U.S. Treasury Department and the IMF, the proposal was dropped 
by November.
47
 To many Asian leaders, the U.S. antagonism to the creation of a pan-Asian 
stabilization fund seemed as though Washington’s top priority was maintaining its financial 
dominance in the region by only supporting the IMF in which the U.S. had much influence.  
After regaining control over the post-crisis international settlement, the IMF then set out 
the details of “structural adjustment policy” in return for financial bailouts. The policy contained 
a far-reaching reform packages: “high interest rates and a tightening of domestic credit to slow 
economic growth; fiscal tightening, including cuts in food and energy subsidies; and further 
liberalization of international capital flows including those relating to the domestic financial 
service market and foreign exchange controls.”
48
 The policy based on misdiagnosis of the 
problem unmistakably exacerbated the situation. South Korea was required to rescind virtually 
every remaining restriction on capital flows, making itself more vulnerable to the international 
speculation. South Korean currency (the won) had depreciated by 80 percent soon after it signed 
a deal with the IMF. In the first few months of the intervention, the IMF also failed to organize a 
rollover of the short-term debt owed by Indonesian firms. Thus, Indonesian currency and 
economy suffered, as the firms could not even acquire enough credits for essential imports and 
exports. As a result, the Indonesian Rupiah took its worst plunge just days after the signing of the 
second IMF agreement in January 1998. The IMF made a further mistake of disbursing the funds 
too little and too late to alleviate the damage. Only $3 billion had been provided by March 1998, 
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as opposed to the $40 billion commitment.
49
 In short, the IMF’s structural reforms were in many 
cases economically unsound and they failed to bring market confidence in the region.  
Those countries could have fared better if they resorted to different solutions such as 
refusing the aid offered by the IMF. Malaysia stood out as a model in this alternative scenario; 
the country implemented many policies in completely opposite direction compared to the 
policies adopted by other Asian countries under the IMF supervision. Instead of further opening 
its economy, Malaysia instituted various task force agencies for capital controls, in an effort to 
reduce speculative trading in its currency. In order to revitalize the economy, Malaysia made 
massive government spending instead of taking severe budget cuts. Finally, the Malaysian 
central bank, Bank Negara Malaysia, instituted a low interest rate (as opposed to high interest 
rates suggested by the IMF) policy to ease domestic credit and spur economic activity. Thanks to 
these policies, economic growth settled at slow yet sustainable pace. Malaysia had GDP growth 
of 5.6 percent in 1999 from -7.5 percent in 1998, and massive current account deficit gradually 
became a fairly substantial surplus.
50
   
d. The Role of the Crisis in East Asian Regionalism 
The 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis created economic and social chaos in several East 
Asian countries, but it nevertheless boosted the awareness of East Asia as a region. This 
realization came about in three ways.  
First, the crisis emphasized the vulnerability of East Asian economies as they became 
exposed to the decisions and whims of ‘international investment cartel’ beyond national control; 
contagion effects fueled by speculation and herd behavior of foreign investors threw more and 
more countries into financial mayhem. The crisis provided political will to engage in further 
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economic integration and build a cooperative regional financial institution to prevent similar 
crisis in the future. 
Secondly, the crisis aroused renewed concern over the lack of a stable long-term debt 
market, which can serve as a main avenue of investment for high savings enjoyed by many East 
Asian countries. According to Jennifer Amyx, a professor from University of Pennsylvania, East 
Asian countries failed to take advantage of their own high levels of savings because the savings 
deposited into local banks tend to be redirected to international financial centers mostly based in 
Europe and the U.S., and then come back into the region as short-term dollar-denominated 
loans.
51
 As mentioned above, these short-term debts greatly contributed to the instability of many 
Asian currencies while making economies susceptible to the herd mentality that often manifests 
itself among global fund managers. A well-developed regional organization such as the proposed 
Asian Monetary Fund could provide more financial instruments to better mobilize East Asia’s 
vast amounts of savings, guaranteeing ‘safer’ investments.   
Thirdly, the crisis made intraregional trade to become ever more important for regional 
economic growth. Roberto F. de Ocampo
52
 argues that the growing intra-regional trade helped 
the East Asian economies to recover more quickly following the crisis as Japanese and American 
market went through economic slumps. By 2005, intraregional trade had grown to more than 40 
percent of total trade, comparable to that of the North American Free Trade Area, becoming an 
effective mechanism to diversify the region’s export destination.
53
   
Overall, the Asian financial crisis was a driving force behind increasing regional 
cooperation in East Asia. Initially, the material and psychological consequences of the 1997 
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crisis drove many affected countries to have defensive motivations to guard their countries 
against capital interests outside the region.  The depth of resentment against the intrusive, 
insensitive role-played by the IMF and the US (which de facto largely dictates the IMF’s policies) 
intensified in those countries. Not only did it come too late, but its ‘one size fits all’ attitude with 
‘structural adjustment policy’ prescription created much political and economic anguish in 
countries like Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, and South Korea who accepted IMF loans, while 
Malaysia, which did not accept the loans, escaped this anguish. However as times went by, the 
idea of East Asian regional community had been increasingly shaped by an intraregional desire 
to deal with common concerns. All countries shared a desire to strengthen regional financial 
architecture to promote further deepening of economic interactions that began following the 
Plaza Accord in 1985. According to Solingen, regional organizations are most likely to emerge 
when government leaders in geographically proximate countries share and pursue common 
internationalizing agendas that lead them to conclude that cross-border cooperation will be to 
their collective benefit.
54
 The crisis was a trigger for regional policymakers to realize such 
benefit of regional cooperation to manage financial globalization and prevent future crisis.  
2.2. 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis and Asia-Pacific Response  
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis tested the economic cooperation of ASEAN member 
states. During the 2007 Global Financial Crisis, the ASEAN economies, except Japan, were not 
heavily hit hard in comparison to their Western counterparts (Figure 1).  According to the Asian 
Development Bank, the overall growth in Asia tumbled from its impressive peak of 9.5% in 
2007 to 6.3% in 2008 to 3.4% in 2009.55 The cause of this decrease was the collapse in trade, 
business, and consumer confidence in the United States, Europe, and Japan. Among the countries 
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in Asia, Japan was heavily hit because “90% of Japanese exports consist of highly income-elastic 
industrial supplies, capital goods, and consumer durables.”56 Because of this, the collapse of 
European and American markets influenced to the negative impact of Japanese exports.  
Figure 1: 2009 Real GDP Growth Rates
57
 
(Countries in brown were in recession) 
 
 
As Asia-Pacific region saw the United States struggle with the financial crisis, high-level 
policy dialogues were organized to discuss how to tackle the crisis and exchange ideas in 
strengthening the resilience of the region in the future financial crisis. High-level officials 
attended the first dialogue from seventeen Asia-Pacific countries, including officials from all 
ASEAN member states and China.58 Subsequent policy discussions continued through the years 
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to further prepare the region in the future. Other policy discussions include: external debt 
management (Dhaka), strategies to boost competitiveness (Phnom Penh), G-20 agenda 
perspective (Manila, energy security (Nadi), and infrastructure financing (Yogyakarta and 
Almaty).59 These interactive dialogues not only show the commitment in assisting other 
countries by sharing ideas and experiences in responding to crises, but also show the effective 
partnerships of ASEAN member states and other Asia-Pacific countries.  
a. China and East Asia after the Global Financial Crisis 
During the Global Financial Crisis, China’s growth remained one of the highest in the 
world. In early 2015, the Chinese government released its annual economic report and the 2014 
report shows the lowest growth rate since the 1990s (Fugure 2). China’s growth slowdown does 
not implicate to its relationship with East Asia. The economic growth is easing due to lower 
demand, slowing industrial production and declining exports, which is a global phenomenon. 
Moreover, the “continued measures to contain local government debt, contain shadow banking, 
reduce excess capacity, curb energy demand, and control pollution will reduce investment and 
manufacturing growth [in China].”
60
 The World Bank forecasts the economic slowdown not only 
in China but also in the region. 
61
 Based on the economic forecasts of international financial 
institutions, the slowdown in global economic growth will not necessary influence economic 
relationship with other Asian countries. To boost Chinese influence in the region, the Chinese 
government’s effort is promoting internationalization of the Chinese Renminbi (RMB), which is 
widely accepted by South East Asian countries as cross-border trade transactions are traded in 
                                                 
59
 Ibid.  
60
 Noble, Josh. “World Bank trims east Asia growth forecasts.” Financial Times. 13 April 2015. < 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/119b58d6-e18e-11e4-9b30-00144feab7de.html#axzz3ZPgSfc3q>.  
61




 With the effort to promote the relationship of China to the West, with the approval from 
the Chinese government, the United Kingdom is the first non-Chinese sovereign to offer RMB 
bond, in “a move to the currency’s global appeal and the UK’s desire for London to be the major 
offshore renminbi hub.”
63
 The influence of the RMB arises from China’s trading partners in the 
region and the rest of the world.  




To further increase the influence of China in the region, the establishment of the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2014 by the Chinese government is the turning point in 
strengthening its trade and diplomatic relationships. The development of the bank is caused by 
the refusal of China to have more say in the World Bank and the IMF. As a World Bank de facto, 
the AIIB will assist in financing infrastructure projects in the Asian region. Opposed by the 
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United States because of its labor and environmental concerns and lack of transparency, the AIIB 
received an overwhelming number of members from U.S. allies, including Australia, New 
Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
65
 The 
decision of the United States “screwed up” for its refusal to join the AIIB according to former 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.
66
 While at its development stage, member-states do not 
see any lack of transparency in setting the rules as major players in the international community 
(i.e. the United Kingdom and France) will have a say as part of the founding members. The 
implication of the development of the AIIB signifies the commitment of China in Asia, 
particularly in East Asia, by using it as its soft power strategy, which in turn makes the 
establishment of the East Asian Community more feasible.  
2.3. Economic Benefits of Establishing an East Asian Community 
The positive and visionary part of creating an East Asian Community includes benefits of 
increased intraregional trade, financial security, and stabilization of exchange rates in the region.   
a. Trade 
East Asian Community can intensify the force of intraregional economic 
interdependence. The benefits of this force are: reducing tariffs, administrative procedures, 
testing requirements and other transaction costs; improving the protection of intellectual property 
rights and the transparency of various government regulations; and strengthening economic 
linkages between high- and low-growth areas in order to improve the economic performance of 
the region as a whole and help facilitate the “catch-up” process of developing member states 
through technology transfer. Increasing economic interaction can also contribute to political 
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stability and harmonious diplomatic relations among member states, thereby providing a basis 
for institutionalized intergovernmental cooperation. In short, the EAC can boost intraregional 
trade through a systematic approach to target various problems that jeopardize the effectiveness 
of cross-border business operations.
67
 
The EAC can further the intra-regional trade by creating an East Asian Free Trade 
Economic Zone which can lower the costs of international trades among Asian countries even 
more. It will make production networks in the region more competitive and attractive to foreign 
investments. It can also meet the desire of export-oriented economies to have diverse markets in 
the world as the domestic demand in the region, particularly consumer spending, rises. The 
important caveat here is that East Asia will not likely become a self-sufficient economic block at 
least in the immediate future despite of the overwhelming evidence of growing regional trade. 
Because East Asia’s dependence on final demand from extra-regional industrial countries, the 
U.S. and Euro-zone members provides a strong incentive to be open to other regions in the world. 
According to the study done by the Monetary Authority of Singapore in 2001, approximately 78 
percent of exports of East Asian economies excluding Japan were directly or indirectly bound for 
markets outside of the region.
68
 This economic reliance makes the idea of building protectionist 
regional trades block in East Asia almost equivalent to an economic suicide. Therefore, the first 
step for an East Asian FTA will not be to pursue a self-contained market, but rather to establish a 
complementary regional market on top of existing global export destinations.     
b. Financial Security 
On top of trade facilitation, the East Asian Community can also serve functions of 
financial surveillance and cooperation. It can fill the gap void left by the IMF, which lacks speed 
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and flexibility in handling financial difficulties specific to East Asia as demonstrated by 
disastrous IMF prescription of the Asian financial crisis via the ‘structural adjustment policy.’ 
The main concern shared by East Asian countries is to avoid a similar financial crisis to that 
experienced in 1997. Many initiatives have been proposed so far to address this common concern. 
These are founded on three major goals: 
- Creation of a regional liquidity support facility through the Chiang Mai Initiative; 
- Establishment of economic surveillance, particularly through the ASEAN + 3 
Economic Review and Policy Dialogue process; and 
- Development of Asian bond markets. 
 
First, Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) was introduced at the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ 
Meeting in Chiang Mai, Thailand, in May 2000. It was the first regional financing agreement 
aimed to establish a network of currency swaps to help members deal with future crisis. The 
thirteen member countries agreed to set up bilateral exchanges of hard currency reserves. This 
liquidity support facility was designed to manage regional currency attacks and contagion effects, 
thus defending member economies from “speculative attacks and avert liquidity crisis stemming 
from unexpected outflows of foreign capitals.”
69
 The CMI is comprised of two elements—the 
expansion of the existing ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA) – augmented to US $1 billion- and 
the creation of a new network of bilateral swap arrangements (BSAs) among ASEAN + 3 
members. Two member states in particular, China and Japan, were expected to be regional 
anchors in this currency-swap scheme with their monumental foreign-exchange reserves. By 
2007, they had reserves of $1.2 trillion and $900 billion respectively.
70
 In 2007, East Asia as a 
whole had the world’s largest reserves at about $3 trillion, or roughly two-thirds of the world’s 
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 By pooling these reserves together to guarantee financial stability in the region, Chiang 
Mai initiative could be seen as a concrete step towards the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund- 
a quashed proposal due to fierce objection from the IMF and the US in 1997. But the CMI 
initiative still has much room for improvement. One noticeable short-fall of CMI is that members 
could only receive 10 percent of short term financial assistance requested directly from the fund; 
the remaining 90 percent is provided to the requestor under the IMF supervision and its tough 
conditionality such as the “structural adjustment policy.”
72
 East Asian governments should 
gradually increase the percentages of the award directly from the CMI assistance fund, and 
reduce the reliance on the IMF supervision of the CMI fund over time.    
Secondly, efforts to improve regulation and supervision in the financial sector had also 
been made via ASEAN+3 Economic Review and Policy Dialogue (ERPD). Introduced in 1993, 
it was by far the region’s most advanced and prominent forum which aims to manage the risks 
involved with increased capital flows and provide an early warning of potential crisis.
73
 Region-
wide surveillance was crucial as financial trouble in one country can elicit massive investor panic 
and spill over to neighboring countries as shown in 1997 crisis. Thus, ERPD was a valuable 
avenue to collect timely and reliable data and conduct objective analysis of member economies’ 
conditions, risks and vulnerabilities. It could also identify various policy options to reduce risks 
and irregularities. ERPD works through mutual monitoring and sharing of information on short-
term capital movements in the vicinity among East Asian countries. Moreover, it facilitated 
exchanges of views, and collaboration on financial, monetary, and fiscal issues based on 
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common interests in general.
74
 ERPD was currently studying an effective mechanism to 
encourage the country in trouble to take appropriate policy actions. On the whole, it was 
gradually evolving into a centrally administered regional financial forum that can ultimately be 
more independent of the IMF. One clear benefit of a successful ERPD process would be 
lessening of financial burden to stock up huge foreign currency assets. The memory of the Asian 
crisis encouraged several East Asian countries to develop self-assurance arrangement against the 
potential currency crisis. They had accumulated large foreign exchange reserves, mostly in U.S. 
Treasury bonds, at high cost: low interest rates accrued to the bonds and the decline of the dollar. 
With improved financial security through cooperative forum such as ERPD, countries could 
afford to invest their savings to more productive fields.  
Thirdly, initiatives have been taken to further develop Asian bond market in order to 
channel a vast pool of savings to long-term investment for growth within East Asia. This effort 
intends to reduce the dependence on external financing based on foreign-currency, encouraging 
development of national and regional capital, especially bonds, and markets. Such an effect can 
mitigate the “double mismatch” problem prevalent in East Asian capital market prior to the 
Asian financial crisis; most of the debts were denominated in foreign currency and had short 
term-maturity, resulting in a dangerous mismatch for financing long-term projects. In 2003, 
ASEAN+3 launched the Asian Bond Markets Initiative to provide the much-needed 
infrastructure for a well-functioning regional bond market.
75
 The initiative includes two types of 
markets: (1). Asian Bond Fund I invests in dollar-denominated bonds and limited access to East 
Asia-Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP), which is a group of the eleven central banks and 
monetary authorities of Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New 
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Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.  (2). Asian Bond Fund II, introduced in 2005, 
invests in local-currency-denominated bonds and is accessible to private investors.
76
 Financial 
ministers of member countries aim to further develop the second type of regional bond market as 
it can successfully resolve the “double mismatch” problem by issuing bonds denominated in a 
basket of Asian currencies. Establishing infrastructures like regional bond guarantee agency and 
the regional rating agencies can make improvement to Asian bond market.
77
       
c.  Exchange Rate Policy Coordination 
The third economic benefit of establishing the East Asian Community is that it can 
provide institutional support to maintain intra-regionally stable exchange rates. A step-by-step 
approach to regional exchange rate policy is recommended, as there is no such coordination in 
the region as of now. The idea of establishing joint-exchange rate stabilization arose because, 
even though the region has around $3 trillion in reserves, economic activities are mostly 
conducted in non-regional currencies, particularly the U.S. dollar. This dependence makes the 
Asian economy susceptible to fluctuations in the dollar exchange rate to domestic currencies.  
Once the region exhibits greater economic and political convergence, a multi-track 
discussion of constructing a basket of regional currencies of the ASEAN+3 countries can begin. 
The weights of the regional currencies in the basket would reflect the relative economic 
importance of each country in the region, and a common Asian currency unit can be derived in 
that way which can be used to “denominate economic transactions (trade and capital flows) and 
asset stocks (foreign exchange reserves and cross-border bonds), as well as to measure the 
degree of each currency’s exchange rate deviation from the regional average.”
78
 Ultimately, this 
movement will improve coordination of regional economic policies and intra-regional exchange 
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rate stability. Establishing a common basket of currencies seems more realistic in the near future 
than choosing yen or yuan as the region’s monetary anchor. The yen’s power is expected to 
decline along with Japan’s declining relative economic size and import absorptive capacity in 
comparison with Chinese Yuan’s. Despite of its growing international role, the yuan is also not 
ready to become the monetary anchor because many Asian economies with open capital accounts 
find the yuan to possess limited usefulness in international settlement, clearance, financing and 
liquidity holding.
79
 Hence, the Asian Development Bank is currently studying the idea of a 
“notional composite currency unit” that would be a representative indicator of Asian currencies 
as the first step to coordinate exchange rates in the region, instead of pursuing one regional 
monetary anchor.
80
    
Conclusion 
The role of the financial crises testifies the economic need of the EAC. Establishment of 
an East Asian Community can yield many economic benefits derived from increased financial 
cooperation. Initiatives including a region-wide system of currency swaps, financial regulatory 
body, and Asian bond market can all help members deal with future financial crises. 
Institutionalized regional cooperation cannot only advance on-the-ground intraregional trade, but 
it can also coordinate ‘safe’ financing of the vast production network and investment 
opportunities. Common currency baskets and joint crisis intervention arrangements can 
potentially replace both the risky dollar pegs of the past, and the reliance on the U.S.-led 
international monetary organizations. The establishment of the AIIB East Asian Community is 
expected to be the new driver of economic growth by complementing global and national efforts.  
                                                 
79
 Kawai, Masahiro. “The Role of an Asian Currency Unit for Asian Monetary Integration,” Asian Development 
Bank Institute, paper for conference “Beyond Breton Woods: The Transnational Economy in Search of New 




3.  Political Challenges in the pre-crisis East Asia 
The economic benefits of building a regional institution to advance the production, trade, 
and investment network foundations are clear. An East Asian Community can be useful in 
managing regional issues (particularly in regards to finance) that have arisen from this increased 
economic interdependence and also in developing bargaining power with global institutions and 
governments, especially the U.S. and the European Union. Considering that China is a regional 
hegemon, what are the political challenges that East Asian leaders are experiencing in advancing 
to the creating of the EAC? What inhibits the establishment of the EAC? Serious political efforts 
towards regionalism only took off after the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. I argue that the 
aspirations for building multilateral regional institution are constrained by political realities that 
existed in East Asia of the pre-1997 financial crisis. There are four main political challenges 
lying at the pathway: diversity, rivalry between China and Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN 
countries, Cold-war structure, and the U.S. opposition. 
3.1 Diversity 
From military-ruled Burma, with a per capita income on par with sub-Saharan Africa, to 
democratic Japan, the world’s second-largest economy, diversity and heterogeneity are indeed 
the leitmotif of East Asia. East Asia’s diversity and heterogeneity in social, economic, political 
developments stood as formidable barriers against collective state-led regional efforts. Socially, 
countries differ from each other widely with their Sinic, Shinto, Islamic, Buddhist, Muslim, 
Confucius, and Christian traditions. East Asian citizens remain highly diverse on normative 
identities, including religious, ethnic, linguistic and cultural self-definitions. Economically, 
countries differ widely in per capita incomes, industrial and financial structures, institutional and 
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The gap between low- and high-income countries has constituted an impediment to state-
driven regionalism in East Asia as they have different economic policy objectives and priorities. 
The developmental gaps among the partners of NAFTA and the European Union were much 
smaller than those within East Asia. The U.S. per capita income at the time of NAFTA inception 
was six times that of Mexico. Similarly, Luxembourg’s per capita income was 16 times larger 
than that of Turkey when Turkey entered into a customs union with the EU at the beginning of 
1996.
82
 In East Asia, by contrast, Japan’s nominal per capita income (approx. $40,000) was fifty 
times larger than that of Cambodia (approx. $782) in 2009.  
 On top of economic developmental differences, East Asian states differ from each other 
on other criteria of national capabilities. Prof. Paul F. Diehl of the University of Illinois has 
compared the power distributions among members of the ASEAN+3 regional grouping with 
members of the EU using the latest figures from 2001. National capabilities are measured along 
three dimensions with two indicators each: military (expenditures and personnel), economic 
(iron/steel production and energy consumption), and demographic (total and urban population). 
Table 1 provides a measure of the relative symmetry of group members for each of these six 
indicators as well as for a composite measure (equally weighted aggregation of the six 
indicators): this is the ratio of the value or score for the largest state in the group to the smallest 
state. The greater the ratio, the more asymmetric is the regional association. The finding of the 
table below shows that ASEAN+3 has more asymmetric power distributions than the EU. 
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TABLE 1 Power/National Capability Ratios* ATP and EU (2001) 
Indicator  APT EU 
Composite    830.87   651.24 
Military Expenditure  2,423.63  1446.42 
Military Personnel   385  308 
Energy Consumption  4,927.31 575.11 
Iron/Steel   152,260  44,803 
Total Population  3,895.35 211.36 
Urban Population 240,091 52,930 
*Ratio is the largest state vs. the smallest state in the groups 
 
Source: Diehl Paul F. “Can East Asia be Like Europe? Exploring Selected Conditions for Regional 
Integration” in The Emerging East Asian Community. Kuala Lumpur: Penerbit University, 2006, pp. 51. 
Originally calculated from data at <http://correlatesofwar.org>  
 
Politically, the institutional differences have made it difficult for East Asian economies to 
enforce institutional frameworks. A mixture of democracies, dictatorships, capitalist tax havens 
and communist states led to very little agreement on the fundamental principles of regional 
institutional structure in East Asia.  
In analyzing different regime types, I adopt the Polity IV Project scale of democracy-
autocracy used by Prof. Paul F. Diehl, where the scale is designed that ranges from negative 10 
(pure autocracy) to positive 10 (pure democracy) and it reflects the public participation in a 
state’s political institution. Diehl uses the standard for democratic states with scores of positive 6 
or 7. According to this scheme, all EU member states are considered to be democratic. However, 
the results are less uniform with respect to the ASEAN+3 members. Only five (Indonesia, 
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Philippines, Thailand, Japan, and South Korea) of the thirteen states are considered democratic 
countries. Other states fall in wide spectrum from score of -9 to +4.
83
  
One and whole, lack of symmetry in social, economic, and political capabilities across 
member states have remained as an impediment to reaching political consensus for regional 
integration in East Asia. 
3.2. Rivalry between China and Japan 
Another main political challenge that hindered governmental efforts towards regionalism 
is the intense antagonism between China and Japan. The Sino-Japan relationship has been going 
through a difficult period for two reasons: One is the unsolved historical issue from Imperial 
Japan’s wartime crimes and the apparent denial by rightwing Japanese of the crimes in the past. 
Another one is growing Japanese anxiety of its declining economic and political power position 
as compared to China’s in the world. These political hardships that exist between the two 
regional powers have blocked them from reaching a reasonable level of mutual trust in most part 
of the 20
th
 century. Although the two countries have seen expanding trade and investment ties, 
membership in formal bodies, and informal links including joint military visits and exchanges of 
top government officials, the two political challenges work against the creation of deeper and 
more formalized regional links.  
On the first point, distrust resulting from Japanese imperial crimes before and during the 
Second World War runs deep and wide. As late as in 2002, an opinion poll conducted by the 
Institute of Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences reported 43.3 percent of 
the Chinese respondents thought Japan ‘unfriendly.’ The polls also showed that 53.5 percent of 
respondents answered the Japanese military invasion of China as their first image of Japan. On 
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China’s negative perception of Japan is largely based on Japan’s war crimes during the 
period of Japanese imperialism. In War without Mercy, John W. Dower explains several broad 
categories that characterized Japanese atrocities:  
“massacres of noncombatants, the maltreatment and killing of prisoners, routinized 
torture, forced labor, and institutionalized murder in the form of lethal medical 
experiments operated… on a large scale in Manchuria (under the murderous contingent 




From the late 19
th
 century to the defeat of the Empire of Japan in 1945, Japanese military 
forces were responsible for killings and other crimes against millions of civilians all across East 
Asia. According to the historian Chalmers Johnson, the Japanese killed as many as 30 million 
Filipinos, Malays, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Indonesians, Burmese, Chinese, and Koreans. 
Japan also plundered the countries it conquered on a monumental scale; it took away not only 
natural resources but also people, enslaving millions and exploiting them as forced laborers – 
sometimes as ‘comfort women’ who were forced to serve as prostitutes for front-line troops.
86
 
Japanese imperial atrocities are comparable to that of Nazi Germany that killed six million Jews 
and 20 million Soviet citizens. However, the difference lied in their post-1945 efforts for 
reparations. The German government made serious gestures towards restitution, paying more 
than $45 billion in compensation so far. Japan, on the other hand, had given its victims a meager 
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$3 billion, while compensating its own Japanese nationals around $400 billion for war losses.
87
 
Thus, there was a widespread perception in East Asia that the Japanese government had not 
accepted the legal responsibility for fully compensating individual victims of Japanese atrocities. 
Many people were also aggrieved by the fact that the official apologies from the Japanese 
government have merely expressed “regret” or “remorse.”
88
 This view was further strengthened 
by an incident on October 2006, where more than eighty Japanese lawmakers from the ruling 
Liberal Democratic Party visited the Yasukuni Shrine – an imperial shrine with thousands of 
Class-A, B, C war criminals’ enshrinement and a museum honoring Japanese war heroes - while 




 The concept of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere created and promulgated by 
the imperial Japan in the early 20
th
 century had also contributed to the Chinese apprehension 
towards the Japan-led regionalism in East Asia. The idea heavily influenced Japan’s foreign 
policy from 1895 (Japan’s annexation of Taiwan) until 1945 (Japan’s defeat in World War II). 
The goal was that by 1950 Japan would achieve economic self-sufficiency by uniting itself with 
Manchukuo and Korea as “one link;” some countries in Southeast Asia would join the link to 
complete Japan’s national defense economy.
90
 Japan claimed that Asians were able to achieve 
“enlightenment and civilization” only via becoming the imperial citizens of the Japanese empire 
by joining the Sphere. Influenced by social Darwinian racism, Japan also argued that the Sphere 




 PBS. Online NewsHour. “I’m Sorry?” December 1, 1998, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/july-
dec98/china_12-1.html.  
89
 Johnson, Chalmers.  
90
 Armstrong, Charles K. Korea at the center: dynamics of regionalism in Northeast Asia/edited by Charles K. 
Armstrong… [et al.] M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, N.Y.: 2006, pp. 100  
 41 
was intended to protect the “yellow” race from the “white” race.
91
 Japan’s imperial pursuit for 
geographical and ethnic identity failed due to an innately closed system created by brute military 
force and racist policies.  
 On the second point, China’s growing economic, political, and military strengths have 
certainly led to increasing Japanese apprehension about China’s role in East Asia. China’s active 
regional diplomacy, especially in Southeast Asia, has helped the country to gradually replace 
Japan as the key trading partner and an important source for investment and overseas 
development assistance. Beijing has also committed itself to support the development of ASEAN 
members through the provision of loans, grants, credit facilities, debt relief, and technical 
assistance. In addition to state apparatus, China has also urged state-owned enterprises and 
private entrepreneurs to invest in Southeast Asia.
92
 As a result, Japan’s importance as a 
destination of ASEAN exports experienced a relative decline in comparison to China’s.
93
 
Similarly, Japan’s investment links with its Asian neighbors have also declined. Furthermore, 
Japan is apprehensive about China’s growing voice in international political arena as 
demonstrated by China’s successful opposition to Japan’s bid to become a permanent member of 
the UN Security Council. Forty-four million Chinese signed a petition against Japan’s bid, 
prohibiting Japan from expanding its influence and power in the world.
94
 Finally, Japan is wary 
of China’s growing military budget, which has grown approximately 10 percent annually over 
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the last fifteen years.
95
 In the early 1990s, China tried to use its military strength to intimidate 
other countries in East Asia, employing aggressive tactics such as sending armed ships to 
disputed islands in the South China Sea.
96
 Such moves by China aggravated Japan’s negative 
perception of China’s rising military might.   
Because of these conflicts over historical issues and power politics in the region, China 
and Japan have not been successful in establishing a reasonable level of mutual trust. The 
acrimony between China and Japan based upon strong nationalist sentiments has posed a real 
check on the development of political consensus towards East Asian regionalism.  
3.3. Rivalry between China and South Korea 
 Besides the conflict between China and Japan, China and South Korea’s relationship had 
been unstable due to the diplomatic relationships of each. To trace China-South Korea relations 
during the second half of the 20
th
 century (1950 – 1992), I will begin by analyzing the two 
countries’ roles in the Cold War structure of the 1950s and 1960s. During these two decades of 
the post-Korean War period, Sino-Korean relations were the product of the great-power rivalry 
between the Soviet Union and the U.S. Ideological norms rather than strategic rationale 
dominated diplomatic relations. Military tensions between Seoul and Beijing were constantly 
reinforced by the conflicts within the U.S.-Soviet bipolar structure.
97
  
In the 1950s, China and North Korea’s strategic alignment with the Soviet Union, as well 
as South Korea and Taiwan’s relationship with the United States were both parts of the Cold-
War structure.
98
 China and South Korea’s urgent need for survival was compounded by the 
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framework of ideological confrontation characterized by “conquer thy neighbor or be conquered 
by it”.
99
 The Korean War was an excellent example of this kind of political atmosphere during 
that time. The expansion of the Cold War into Asia was manifested in the long, bloody battle 
between the South Korean force supported by the U.S. and the North Korean force supported by 
China and the Soviet Union. By late October in 1950, Chinese troops had been secretly deployed 
to engage with American and South Korean troops. At that time, the top general of the U.S.-
Korea forces, General MacArthur, was launching a final drive to unify the whole Korean 
peninsular. However, his triumphant drive was shattered by the Chinese offensive of 200,000 
troops who pushed the American troops back into South Korea. By early 1950s, the total number 
of Chinese troops in Korea reached 1.35 million.
100
 Chinese forces, with their massed formations 
resembling a “human sea”, proved to be the main source of opposition in the peninsula, and 
successfully pushed back the advance of U.S.- Korea forces. The heavy resistance from China 
ultimately led to the signing of an armistice agreement that divided the Korean peninsular along 
the Thirty-eighth Parallel.
101
 The Korean War illustrated the open conflict between the “northern” 
alliance (the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea) and the “southern” counterpart (the U.S. and 
South Korea). Therefore, the hostile relationship between China and South Korea during that 
time was imbedded in a larger global ideological confrontation between the Soviet-led socialist 
bloc and the U.S.-led capitalist bloc.  
  During the 1960s, China’s radicalization of communist ideology under Mao brought 
some changes to the political economic environment in the region. One of the major changes was 
China’s emphasis on the amicable relationship with North Korea. China, at that time, was 
determined to go against not only the U.S. but also the Soviet Union. This determination was 
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manifested in China’s “self-reliance (zili gengsheng)” principle emphasized during the Great 
Leap Forward along the line of antagonizing the Soviet Union and also along the line of 
criticizing the Soviet Union for its pursuit of a “peaceful coexistence” with the U.S.
102
 After the 
Sino-Soviet split, China’s radicalization of Communist ideology began to emphasize a bond with 
North Korea, which went as far as being called an “alliance sealed in blood (xiemeng)”.
103
  This 
change further exacerbated China’s confrontational approach towards South Korea compared to 
that of during the 1950s. South Korea responded to China’s radicalization of ideology and its 
increased ties with North Korea (South Korea’s archenemy) with a strong anticommunist stance 
and its amicable relationship with Taiwan (China’s archenemy). In January of 1967, South 
Korean president Park Chung-Hee passed a new Foreign Trade Laws that prohibited all business 
transactions with Communist countries. This law has effectively blocked economic interaction 
between South Korea and China throughout the 1960s.
104
 South Korea also continued to 
recognize Taiwan as the sole legitimate government of China and kept its strong alliance with 
the United States.  
During the 1980’s, the rapprochement process between South Korea and China reached a 
new level, signaling a possible meltdown of the diplomatic tensions between the two states that 
existed in the last three decades. Starting around this time, both nations began to voice interest 
towards greater economic interaction through bilateral trade. This fundamental shift in foreign 
policy marked the beginning of a new bilateral relationship in East Asia.  
In the early 1980’s, Friedrich List’s book, The National System of Political Economy, had 
been generating many heated discussions in Chinese academia regarding its path towards 
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modernization, where he argued that the strong state-centered developmental model is needed to 
“grease the wheels of industrialization,” and that late industrializers cannot afford to just leave 
their economies at the mercy of the invisible hand of free market.
105
 Chinese leaders indeed saw 
with their own eyes the continuing success of South Korea’s strong state-centered developmental 
model. During the 1980s, South Korea was experiencing one of the best periods in its economic 
history, having its GNP (Gross National Product) growth at an annual rate of 9.9 percent and the 
highest level of trade surplus in Korea’s history ($8.8 billion).
106
 Inspired by Korea’s economic 
success, China showed its keen interest in learning more about South Korea’s developmental 
model. Its interest was shown in the establishment of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 




China also showed interest in emulating some of the targets for economic development 
from the Korean model. For example, Deng Xiaoping’s comment to the Central Advisory 
Commission of the Chinese Communist Party included the projection of quadrupling China’s 
GNP in 2000 which was closely linked to President Park Chung Hee’s projection figure in South 
Korea.
108
 China’s deep interest in the Korean economic model was one of the reasons for its 
increasing reception to more economic exchanges with South Korea. The other reason was 
China’s search for foreign capital and technology. China thought that South Korea could be a 
beneficial economic partner who would offer both, especially the much-needed intermediate-
level technology for the development of heavy industry.
109
 This gesture of China’s “opening” 
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attitude towards economic interaction with South Korea was well received by the Korean 
government who was relentlessly searching for oversea markets where Korea could sell its 
exports and utilize the abundant industrial resources which Korea lacked significantly.
110
  
3.4. Rivalry between China and other ASEAN member states  
Territorial disputes in the South China Sea are one of the most controversial conflicts 
between China and several ASEAN countries. Territorial dispute is a very sensitive topic in the 
region, as China becomes a regional hegemony in both military and economic. Besides China, 
Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, and Vietnam claim the Paracel and Spratley Islands.  
Moreover, Japan, China, and Taiwan claim the Senkaku Islands. The disputed islands are 
important economically as there is large amount of unexplored oil and natural gas. China and 
Taiwan are basing their claims based on history while the others with the United Nations 
Convention of the Law of Sea, where it states that sovereign jurisdiction of the land shall not 
exceed beyond the 200 nautical miles from the baseline of the shore.
111
 In 2014, China’s military 
presence in the region is strong as it imposed fishing permits, including using force against 
Vietnamese and Chinese naval ships, in the South China Sea.
112
 Even though China uses its 
economic power to leverage the protests of neighboring countries with its territorial claims, the 
inevitable response of the ASEAN member states in the 2014 ASEAN Summit forced China to 
be in compliance with the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, where it 
shows that ASEAN member states against China shows that there is a strong cooperation among 
other countries that are also claiming the islands. Since China is a major trading partner of 
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ASEAN members, unilateral actions may heighten the tension, which may lead to jeopardizing 
trade partnerships and humanitarian assistance from member states of developing countries.   
Economic interdependence promotes effective foreign government connections and 
economic relationships, which increase the cooperation of governments in promoting prosperous 
economies. States with strong economies, those that enjoy prosperity and are experiencing 
economic growth, may be disinclined to fight.
113
 They argue that people are inclined to be 
engaged in military conflict if there is a higher rate of economic growth. The core goal of states 
with strong economies is economic prosperity than military power. Countries with high 
economic growth focus more in strengthening their trading partnerships between states because 
cooperation plays an important role in developing and maintaining economic relations, which 
means that economic power weighs more than military power. The likelihood of a dispute is 
much lower when states are dependent on bilateral trade.”
114
A military conflict can jeopardize 
economic partnerships, which can paralyze the economy of either of the states. Though the 
military presence of China to the disputed territories is high, it is less likely that military force 
will be used in claiming the territories as it may affect China’s economic independence with not 
only with ASEAN countries but also with the international community.  
3.5. The Cold War Structure 
Since the late 19
th
 Century, Asia has fallen under the prevailing global and regional 
influences of the Western powers, colonialism, and military conquests. Following the Second 
World Ward, the region’s fragmentation continued in two ways:  
(a).  Decolonization   
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Most countries in East Asia have only gained their sovereignty very recently. Therefore, 
most governmental efforts went towards national building: “the creation of stable armies and 
police forces, the consolidation of domestic bureaucratic system and its extractive capabilities, 
the inculcation of a spirit of national loyalty, the securing of national borders, and the promotion 
of economic development.”
115
 National interests and national identity posed as powerful forces 
against pressures of regionalism that required relinquishment of some sovereignty of individual 
nation. Furthermore, a century or more of social, cultural, and political fragmentation hindered 
reaching commonly agreed-upon goals across the region.  
(b). The Cold War   
Soon after the end of the Second World War, the onset of the Cold War geopolitical forces 
has greatly influenced the shaping of diplomatic relations among nations in East Asia. A network 
of American bilateral security alliances with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and later Thailand and 
the Philippines, had three primary objectives: to maintain a stable balance of power in the region, 
to contain the military and ideological challenge of the Soviet Union and Communist China, and 
to ensure commercial access to Asian markets.
116
  These U.S. centered pan-Pacific linkages tied 
these countries economically and strategically to the U.S. and have effectively created the ‘hub–
and –spoke” system; the image of multiple Asian countries all separately linked to the US can be 
paralleled to the image of many ‘spokes’ connected to the ‘hub’ in a wheel. The US bilateral 
system was more or less put in place after President Truman approved the large-scale US 
rearmament envisaged in National Security Council document 68 in 1950. The NSC document 
called for annual expenditures 300 percent above that originally requested by the Pentagon for 
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During the Cold War, East Asia was effectively divided between the American alliance 
and the Soviet Union-influenced alliance including countries such as the People’s Republic of 
China, North Korea, and North Vietnam. These two separate Cold War-era alliances provided 
very little basis for the formation of integrated Asia. The divisive residues of the Cold War were 
manifested by the cleavage of Korea at its midpoint by the U.S. and the USSR and the separation 
within “greater China.” The Cold War had also indirectly induced many territorial border 
disputes in the South China Sea and internal fragmentation in several Southeast Asian countries 
as demonstrated by Indochina in the mid-1960s experiencing the Cold War-inspired bloodbath.    
3.6. The U.S. Opposition 
The Cold-War legacy of the U.S. bilateral security alliance restricted exercising a 
consistent American policy on intraregional cooperation within East Asia.  Further, Washington 
has tried to forestall intra-Asian integration that appeared to exclude the U.S. in fear of losing its 
balance of power in the region. As a country that has great political and economic influence in 
the region, the U.S.’ strong reaction to the movement towards East Asian regionalism led many 
Asian government leaders to abandon state-driven regional integration during the 1990s. 
Following the disappointing progress of the Uruguay Round Ministerial meeting in 
December 1990 and emergence of preferential regional trade arrangements in North America, 
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad proposed the vision of the East Asian Economic 
Group (EAEG) concept which called for the formation of a regional trade grouping – comprised 
of ASEAN countries, Japan, China, Korea and Hong Kong. The Bush administration vehemently 
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opposed to this proposal on the grounds that it was promoting the notion of a restrictive trading 
bloc not consistent with General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
118
 In response to the 
American reaction, Malaysia changed the name of the proposal to the East Asian Economic 
Caucus (EAEC) after consultation with other ASEAN members in October 1991, and it made 
clear the nature of the group to be a loose form of regional forum on regional economic issues, 
not an institutionalized entity nor a trading block to which the U.S. objected.
119
 Despite the 
effort to avoid any misinterpretation of the proposal, American opposition remained. In 
November 1991, Baker was asked to provide specific reasons behind the U.S. objection to the 
EAEC. He answered; “We would have absolutely no objection whatsoever, none in the world, to 
a free trade agreement that was consistent with the GATT that embraced the same membership 
as was contemplated for the EAEC… But a consultative or policymaking body, that is, a regional 
sub-grouping that draws the line down the Pacific… would (undermine the effectiveness and the 
efficacy of APEC, to which the U.S. is part of).”
120
 U.S. Secretary of State James Baker made 
further controversial comments in a behind-the-scenes American campaign against the EAEC 
proposal. According to an article from Washington Post entitled “U.S. Lobbies against 
Malaysian Trade Plan,”  Baker “unusually blunt admonition” to South Korea’s foreign minister 
Lee Sang Ock regarding the Korean government opinion of the Malaysian plan. He later noted, 
“My message was simple: All the countries are not equal. The South Koreans got it, and did not 
press for an EAEG.”
121
 After hearing Baker’s account of the U.S. opposition to the plan, many 
Asian leaders thought that Washington was using double standards; the U.S. welcomed the 
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creation of NAFTA but not EAEC, which called for a much looser form of regionalism than 
NAFTA did. This reasoning of the U.S. diplomatic action inevitably left uncomfortable feelings 
among Asian nations; they wondered why the U.S. had to restrict their freedom to meet and talk 
with other country leaders.  
Instead of the East Asian Community, the Obama Administration is pushing towards the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which is a trade deal between the United States, Latin America, 
and Asia. Obama stressed that “if we don’t write the rules, China will write the rules out in the 
region… we will be shut-out that will mean a loss of U.S. jobs.”
122
 Besides the economic 
incentive of the TPP, Obama’s push towards the partnership is a political strategy of the 
administration. Power distribution is one of the major concerns for the United States as China 
becomes politically involve in international organizations. Moreover, as its economic prosperity 
continues to increase, China's influence in the international community continues to grow. As 
China expands its influence in East Asia, Africa and part of Western Asia, the U.S. fears that it 
will affect global order.  
In terms of international order, liberals argue that the rising powers will use their growing 
influence in order to reshape the rules to serve their interests, where the declining power will see 
the rising power nation as a security threat. Even though some scholars argue that China will be 
unlikely to use force during the transition of power, the U.S should strategize its policies in order 
to maintain its power. The United States should build an effective international order by focusing 
more in strengthening its policies on foreign assistance rather than military force. In a liberal 
perspective, the United States should continue to encourage free trade particularly to developing 
countries. Moreover, it should also provide financial and educational assistance to developing 
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economies particularly in East Asia, where China is trying to build partnerships to East Asian 
countries to build effective relationships with its neighbors. The U.S. Government should 
strengthen its Peace Corps and USAID programs because they are effective and valuable 
programs in establishing partnerships with other countries.  
Besides strengthening the United States’ policy in foreign assistance, it should assist 
rising nations in strengthening international security policies during the transition of power. The 
U.S. has influenced China’s multilateral policies in bringing security in the East Asian region. 
Xuefeng states “China and the United States collectively applied pressure upon North Korea… 
to surrender its nuclear weapons and terminate its nuclear tests.”
123
 This action shows the 
partnership of China with the U.S. government in terms of regional security. China and North 
Korea are allies in the region, but the action showed by the Chinese government shows that there 
is a limitation within the alliance when global order is at risk.  
According to Shambough’s article on containment and engagement in China, “the PRC 
(People’s Republic of China) is unwilling to use force to achieve its aims in Asia. China’s 
preferred tactics is to command respect and obeisance through patronage and preponderant 
power.”
124
 As the China’s economic power continues to grow, we will see its strong influence in 
the international arena. Its involvement in international organizations will more like to increase. 
Moreover, other states will show their respect and promote effective alliances with China. 
Military conflicts, on the other hand, are less likely to happen because the role of economic 
interdependence and international organizations are very strong. Though it will be very difficult 
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for China to adopt the Western style of leadership because of cultural differences, the Chinese 
government will be able to perform its responsibilities as a superpower nation.  
Conclusion 
This chapter asked for the political challenges that the EAC may experience prior its 
establishment. I looked at the various sets of political challenges that have obstructed and may 
still be affecting the forming of an intra-regional cooperative body such as EAC in pre-1997 
crisis East Asia. Those challenges were: differences existing in the political, economic and 
cultural atmosphere of East Asia, prevailing Cold War alliances leading to regional 
fragmentation, historical animosity between Asian powers (China, Japan, and South Korea), and 
the U.S. confrontation with the idea of an EAC. Based on the analysis in this chapter, I found out 
that the major cause of these political challenges is the influence of the U.S. to the two major 
players (Japan and South Korea). Because of strong opposition from the U.S., which was 
suspicious of Mahathir’s protectionist disposition along with ambivalence from Japan and many 
other East Asian countries (they did not want to jeopardize their bilateral relations with the US), 
interest in the EAEG/EAEC proposal died out eventually.
125
 The failure of the EAEC plan left a 
long-lasting impression that Washington was simply against an EAEC that did not include the 
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4.  Overcoming Political Challenges 
Over the past twenty to thirty years, many of the previous political and cultural barriers 
against East Asian cooperation have disappeared and the region’s economic, political leverage 
within the world grew. Considering this, how realistic is regional integration in East Asia having 
China being a major political player?  
Today’s broader political economic climate became more conducive to state-driven 
regional cooperation. Due to the expanding regional trade networks promoted by Japan’s “flying 
geese” economic investment model and the shock wave caused by the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis, Asian political leaders today recite the slogans of regional unity and harmony. Thus, at 
the 1999 ASEAN +3 meeting, Philippine President Joseph Estrada spoke of “the dream” of “an 
East Asian Common Market, and East Asian currency and one East Asian community.” The 
South Korean president talked of the need to find ways to “nurture East Asia into a single 
community of cooperation” and to promote an “East Asian Economic Cooperation System.” The 
Chinese premier indicated his preference for “closer East Asian cooperation” to “strengthen and 
deepen” what he called this “effective dialogue mechanism.”
126
 In his speech to the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in 2009, then-newly elected Japanese Prime Minister Yukio 
Hatoyama claimed that building an East Asian community is on top of his agenda as “there is no 
way Japan can develop without deeply involving itself in the Asia and the Pacific region.”
127
 
There are four developing political realities that have helped to generate an awareness of regional 
commonalities and the need for a regional institution:  
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1. Rising cosmopolitan middle class who share similar mind-set thanks to the expanding 
pan-Asian collaborative cultural production network; 
2. Signs of increasing cooperation between China and Japan, South Korea and ASEAN 
countries.  
3. Transition to post-Cold War political structure in East Asia; and  
4. Possibility of the U.S. co-opting the idea of an East Asian community.  
4.1 Diversity  Homogeneity  
Growing economic integration spurred by East Asia-wide trade and production networks 
has not only brought down the costs of cross-border business and transaction costs, but also 
helped to promote increasing intra-regional contacts within East Asia. We have seen an 
increasing density of social communications in East Asia in areas such as telephone and mail 
communication, shipping and aviation, tourism, television and satellite broadcasts, and legal and 
illegal migration,.
128
 This social network has generated pan-Asian cultural commonalities and 
new perceptions of community at the popular, rather than the elite, level.
129
  
The implications of this growing pan-Asian satellite networks are two-folds. First, rising 
urban middle classes across East Asia have begun to share a similar mind-set via consuming 
increasingly homogenous pop-culture goods. In television and music, the sweeping fever for 
Korean pop culture, dubbed “Korean wave” or “Hallyu,” has enjoyed large popularity across 
China, Japan, and Southeast Asia starting in the late 1990s. The Korean TV dramas such as 
Winter Sonata, Full House and Dae Jang Geum have helped the total exports of Korean cultural 
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products to reach over $20 billion in 2005.
130
  These Korean TV dramas greatly appealed to local 
audiences, thanks to cultural affinities Korea shared with other Asian countries. In China, dramas 
starring actor Ahn Jae-wook and actress Kim Hee-sun long dominated the primetime airwaves. 
In Vietnam, Korean actor Jang Dong-gun and actress Kim Nam-ju have reached the status of 
national celebrities; the Korean government even felt compelled to invite them to an official 
dinner for Vietnamese President Tran Duc Luong during his state visit to Korea in 2001.
131
 The 
Korea wave was further bolstered by Korean pop music, which appeals to young local fans with 
dynamic rhythms, flashy dance moves, and heart-throbbing lyrics. A Korean idol group, 
Tohoshinki, the most popular K-pop group in Asia nowadays, has broken plenty of records in 
Japanese music industry, topping Japanese Oricon charts’ daily, weekly, and monthly rankings. 
The release of their twenty-ninth single, “Break Out!” in 2010 made them the first foreign artist 
to have seven number-one singles on the Oricon. Another album “Best Selection 2010” reached 
double platinum status in Japan, selling more than 500,000 copies in mere 11 days after its 
release.
132
 Japanese popular culture has also attracted millions of people across Asia. J-pop 
dominates much of Taiwan’s music market as demonstrated by Hikaru Utada, a Japanese female 
singer, who sold millions of copies in Taiwan. Another Japanese idol singer, Noriko Sakai, sells 
more albums in Asia than in her home country. She sold over 6.5 million albums in Asia, and 
became a familiar face from her participation in TV dramas, commercials for Panasonic and 
Canon corporations, and concert tours throughout Asia.
133
 Another popular facet of J-pop is 
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animation and character industry. The mega-popular Pokemon and Japanese toymaker Sanrio’s 
“Hello Kitty” have achieved iconic status across Asia as the prime example of cuteness.  
Second, as Asian youth are beginning to find cultural icons in their own backyards, new 
industries based on Asia-wide collaboration advertise and market the cultural products geared 
towards the Asia’s urban middle classes. Thus, pan-Asian satellite networks not only finds 
increasing homogenization of popular culture in the region, but it also finds cultural production 
networks spread across East Asia in film, television, print, video games, and radio industries. In 
film, directors such as South Korea’s Ji-woon Kim and Thailand’s Pen-ek Ratanaruang, have 
collaborated on various pan-Asian productions such as “Last Life in the Universe.”
134
 Released 
in 2006, the movie “Battle of Wits” was based on the Chinese Three Kingdom history depicted 
in a popular Japanese Manga, and it was later created into a movie by a director from Hong 
Kong. The movie also has two influential Korean actors as important characters. In television, 
the Japan Broadcasting Co. (NHK), Japan’s equivalent of Britain’s BBC, started to collaborate 
with other countries’ news agencies to air regional events/issues in sports, fashion, music and 
culture. MTV Asia, broadcasted by Star TV of Hong Kong, began airing programs highlighting 
the best regional album and music video by compiling popularity ratings of each Asian artist in 
East Asia. Other forms of art are also produced by Asia-wide collaborative efforts. Asian art 
biennales and new Asian art museums typically feature regional themes, and open exhibitions in 
different places of Asia every year.
135
 A pop operetta titled “Nagraland” featuring a theme about 
breaking away from Western culture to pursue an Asian identity, debuted across East Asia. A 
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Japanese producer, an Indonesian director, a Singaporean costume designer and a Malaysian 
choreographer created the musical.
136
  
The ‘cosmopolitan culture school’ argues there are distinctive responses of a region to 
universal processes such as globalization.
137
 The “Asianization” of pop culture is an example of 
how East Asia is weaved into broader consumerist and economic trends worldwide while it still 
fosters some sense of East Asian distinctiveness. Today, this phenomenon yields large impact as 
more than half of the region’s population is comprised of people under the age of twenty-four 
who are the most active consumer group of pop culture. The distinctive development of 
consumer/production pan-Asian network of pop culture is inherently different from globalization 
phenomenon in other countries; it is a form of regionalism. Why is that Korean dramas and TV 
shows yet to have found a large audience outside of Asia, such as North America for example? 
How about various Asian singers who topped every Asian music sales record eventually end up 
in a mediocre place in Billboard chart when they enter the U.S. music market? There must be 
some special elements to why Asian pop-culture circulates around and succeed within Asian 
sphere but not so well in other regions of the world. The reasons for its rather limited success can 
be cultural affinity and familiarity to the values (e.g. Confucian or Buddhist) ingrained in the 
Asian pop-art or economic ease of circulating the cultural items within the region thanks to the 
vast collaborative pan-Asian cultural production networks. Regardless of what the reason is, the 
expanding social network of Asian pop-culture has helped to cement links between Asia’s rising 
urban middle classes, and decrease the sense of fragmentation that once divided East Asia. The 
task now is to keep up with the trends of cultural and economic integration in East Asia, and 
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prepare regional institutions (e.g. an East Asian Community) to give space entitled to the 
emerging cosmopolitan generation of Asians.  
4.2.  Rivalry between China and Japan  Signs of Increasing Cooperation  
There are signs of historical and territorial tensions easing between China and Japan, thus 
creating opportunities to overcome the ghosts of a troubled history and move forward East Asian 
integration. Economic and political motivations have set the tone for closer bilateral relationship. 
Japan has been China’s biggest trading partner, surpassing the United States. In 2006, Sino-Japan 
trade surpassed $200 billion, and the total Japanese investment in China has reached $58 billion 
in the same year.
138
 The grounds for cautious optimism in increasing interdependence between 
two countries are based on the realization that both countries can take in monumental economic 
political benefits by promoting cooperation based on mutual economic, security interests. In 
order to do so, building trustworthy relationship by resolving counterproductive 
historical/security issues is essential.   
There were several noteworthy changes that took shape of developing trend of Sino-
Japan cooperation. First, China’s attitude towards its neighbors has also taken dramatic shifts to 
adopt a new priority of regional cooperation. Towards its neighbors, China adopted aggressive 
foreign policy in 90s especially in regards to issues in South China Sea. In the years after 2000, 
however, China had turned around as a friendly neighbor, recreating its image as an enthusiastic 
proponent of Asian integration. New initiatives, such as Boao Forum for Asia, were launched in 
order to bring together Asian opinion leaders to the common development goals in informal 
summits.
139
 The Chinese government started to lessen its pressure over historical issues in hopes 
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of stopping the continuous deterioration of important Sino-Japanese relations. Jiang Zemin’s 
1998 visit to Japan was characterized by bitter feelings on both sides after Jiang lectured on 
wartime past in front of the Japanese emperor. Beijing’s foreign policy leaders realized that 
although a strong position on the issue might serve it well domestically, it could exacerbate 
Japan’s intransigence and further strengthen Japanese right-wing hardliners and resentment 
against ‘apology diplomacy.’
140
 This concern formed the basis of Zhu Rongji’s efforts to tone 
down the history issue in his visit to Japan in October 2002. In addition, China announced that it 
would stop demanding public apologies from the Japanese government.
141
 Leaders in Beijing 
realized that bilateral relation with Japan is crucial for Chinese strategy towards the U.S. In order 
to promote the concept of ‘China’s peaceful rise’ or ‘China’s peaceful development,’ it was 
beneficial for China to have a friendly relation with Japan, the major ally of the U.S. in the Far 
East.    
 From Japan’s point of view, the decline of its conceived importance of the US since the 
end of the Second World War coupled with rising economic integration with China provided ‘a 
turning point’ in renewing Sino-Japan bilateral relation. For decades, Japan’s defense and foreign 
policies had been highly dependent on the US. However, in recent years especially after the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, the US has been concentrating on the Middle East and its 
confrontation with the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Japan increasingly feels that its national security 
was not safeguarded due to the lack of US interest in East Asia. Hence, Japan now seeks more 
independent relationship with the US to promote its national interests and influence in East Asia. 
Renewing its sour relationship with China was crucial in its political efforts to (re)integrate with 
Asia. The new Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)’s 2005 election manifesto supported the idea of 
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an East Asian Community and advances in energy and environment cooperation with major 
countries in East Asia such as China. Like its Chinese counterpart, Japanese government also 
tried to avoid historical animosity when it came to strategically improving bilateral relationship.  
For example, Japan’s newly elected Prime Minister Shinzo Abe chose China as his first foreign 
destination in 2006. China reciprocated Japan’s friendly gesture by agreeing to welcome Abe 
without first obtaining his guarantee not to visit Yasukuni Shrine as the new Prime Minister. 
 In short, increasing signs of cooperation between China and Japan have arisen out of fear 
that cold politics may eventually have an impact on hot economics. Michael Yahuda, a London 
School of Economics professor, argues; “there are limits to how far economic inter-dependence 
between China and Japan can compensate for the ‘thinness’ of other aspects of the relationship. 
It is impossible to separate political considerations from economic activity.”
142
 Aware of this 
danger, both China and Japan have shown their determination to disentangle security/historical 
issues, which have bred political distrust. The Japan-China Comprehensive Policy Conference 
begun in May 2005 at the level of the respective Vice-Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Both 
countries presented the conference as “an opportunity to engage in a frank exchange of 
viewpoints and such, from a medium to long-term perspective.”
143
 It is a big step for both 
countries to recognize that dialogue can be an effective mechanism for deterring future violence 
and misunderstanding. Additionally, the two governments set up the China-Japan Joint History 
Research Committee to work out differences in historical views in December 2006.
144
 Such 
effort is a welcome sign for the development of an East Asian Community, as the concept has 
been much hindered by the deep-rooted political distrust between two great powers in East Asia.  
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4.3. Rivalry between China and South Korea  Diplomatic Normalization  
The shift in foreign policy focus in the 70’s and 80’s has indeed given China and South 
Korea more confidence in building flexible diplomacy based on mutual interests. Their 
increasing confidence was manifested through the positive changes in their rhetoric, policies and 
willingness to engage in positive dialogue. Both China and South Korea took initiatives to 
markedly improve their overall bilateral relations. The rapprochement process between the two 
countries went through three major events in the early 1990s that ultimately produced the 1992 
Sino-Korea diplomatic normalization.  
a. China’s Enrollment into the APEC 
China’s enrollment into the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1991 was a 
major event that provided both China and South Korea an official channel of communication. 
South Korea, already member of the organization, paid special attention in helping China to 
obtain the membership. The Chinese government did not forget this cooperative gesture. By 
presenting an opportunity to affirm both sides’ position on the improvement of the diplomatic 
relationship, China’s enrollment into the APEC was an important first step towards the 1992 
normalization.  
The APEC was established in 1989 to facilitate economic growth, cooperation, trade and 
investment in the Asia-Pacific region. By 1991, there were twelve member states including the 
U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea.
145
 South Korea, which was to host the 
third ministerial meeting in 1991, was particularly interested in getting China into the 
organization before the meeting in Seoul. With an important objective of promoting more 
contacts with China that could further the normalization effort, South Korea did all it could to 
help China become a member.  
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There were many twists and challenges for China’s participation in APEC. China had 
only agreed to join the APEC if certain conditions were met: above all, Taiwan was to be barred 
from full membership as a sovereign country. There must be only one China – the People’s 
Republic of China – who would join APEC as a sovereign country, while Taiwan would join as a 
regional economy. Taiwan, however, steadfastly refused to join APEC under the name of 
“Taiwan, China” and it also refused to discuss this issue directly with China.
146
 To solve this 
deadlock, South Korea’s assistant foreign minister, Lee See Young, repeatedly made trips to 
China and Taiwan, trying to work out a compromise. Only after Lee allegedly threatened Taiwan 
– saying that if it still refused to compromise, APEC would admit China first, - did Taiwan 
eventually give in. In the memorandum that made the compromise official, Taiwan was required 
to use the name “Chinese Taipei,” and only the minister for economic affairs could attend the 
meetings.
147
 South Korea also struck a deal with China that it will not allow Taiwan’s 
ambassador in Seoul to participate in any activities related to the third APEC meeting.
148
 
China’s participation of the APEC meeting in Seoul indeed provided an important 
opportunity for engaging in talks between the Chinese delegation and the Korean official who 
affirmed mutual desire to improve the diplomatic relationship. South Korean President, Roh Tae 
Woo, discussed the relations between South Korea and China, conveying his hopes to improve 
Korea’s ties with China to the extent of establishing diplomatic relations. The Chinese foreign 
minister, Qian Qichen, also conveying China’s wish to achieve greater development in its 
relationship with South Korea, responded his remark.
149
 Exchanging both sides’ positive 
perspective on establishing possible diplomatic ties, the official meeting between two countries’ 
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representatives had a crucial role in building the necessary trust and cooperation for the 1992 
normalization.    
b. Two Koreas’ Admission to the UN 
North and South Korea’s simultaneous admission to the United Nations in 1991 was 
another major event that laid down a stepping-stone towards the 1992 normalization.  
This event resolved a challenge faced by the Chinese government that dealt with how to justify 
recognizing “two Koreas” while maintaining the “One China” policy towards its cross-strait 
problem.  
The Chinese government faced a political difficulty in starting official diplomatic 
relations with South Korea, because it meant China’s decision to recognize both North and South 
Korea’s legitimacy. Such decision could be viewed as a sign of its potential toleration of 
Republic of China (Taiwan) in gaining the status as the legitimate government of China. In order 
to preserve its “One China” framework, China had to separate these two issues as if they had no 
correlation.
150
 One possible way to do this was through “following” the international “norms” 
and not through its own initial “decision” which would involve some harming effect on the 
legitimacy of “One China” policy. If an international organization were to recognize two Koreas 
first, then China could use the rhetoric of only abiding by the norms of international law when it 
wanted to recognize the two Koreas. China would not have to contradict its own decision to not 
recognize both China and Taiwan’s legitimacy. This way, China could draw a clear distinction in 
its foreign policy towards the two Koreas issue and the China-Taiwan cross-strait problem, 
which would also preserve the consistency of its “One China” policy.   
Therefore, the Chinese government exerted every possible effort to persuade North Korea 
and the international community to support the admission of both Koreas into the UN at the same 
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time. China’s effort involved having multiple talks with the North Korean government to 
persuade President Kim Il Sung that it was in North Korea’s best interest to be admitted to the 
UN along with South Korea. At that time, both South Korea and North Korea had UN observer 
status. However, South Korea had been making efforts all along to join the UN as a full member, 
and more and more UN member states were ready to support it. North Korea, on the other hand, 
always opposed admitting both Koreas into the UN as full members, fearing that this decision 
would give sovereign status to both Koreas in the world, which could effectively “perpetuate” 
the divide between them.
151
 China’s first chance to persuade North Korea came when the 
Chinese premier, Li Peng, visited it in May 1991. Premier Li said to the North Korean prime 
minister that if South Korea proposed again to join the UN during the Assembly that year, it 
would be very difficult for China to oppose this. Premier Li further said that once South Korea 
becomes a full member of the UN, it would be very hard for North Korea to join the UN. After 
Premier Li’s visit, President Kim Il Sung stated that North Korea would “cooperate” with China 
to work on the simultaneous admission of both Koreas to the UN.
152
 The only concern North 
Korea still had on this issue, President Kim mentioned, was the possibility of the denial of its 
application by the veto power of the U.S. who would demand to inspect North Korea’s nuclear 
facilities before letting it into the UN. In response to this comment, China assured North Korea 
that it would “consult the relevant countries,” and try to persuade them to be “cooperative” on 
this issue. China’s effort finally bore its fruit on September 17, 1991, with the adoption of a 
resolution at the UN General Assembly, admitting the two Koreas to membership 
simultaneously.
153
 Admission of both Koreas into the UN finally gave China the chance to 
adhere to the “One China” policy towards its cross-strait problem while still “following” the 
                                                 
151




 United Nations official website. “List of Member States.” Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/members/list.shtml. 
 66 
“international norm” of recognizing both Koreas that included starting an official relationship 
with South Korea.  
A series of negotiations between China and South Korea from May to June in 1992 
finally shaped the official terms of the 1992 Sino-Korea normalization. Three rounds of talks 
between the two sides offered them an opportunity to view each other’s preconditions for 
establishing the normalization.  
The first round of negotiation was held in Beijing, a city that could safeguard secrecy of 
the talk better than Seoul could. Each side had six or seven people, including a chief 
representative at the vice-ministerial-level and a deputy chief representative at the ambassadorial 
level. The talk was mainly focused on China’s intentions on the prerequisites of the 
normalization. The Chinese delegation explicitly demanded South Korea to sever diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan, put an end to all its treaties with Taiwan, and withdraw Taiwan’s embassy. 
In response to this demand, the Korean delegation proposed to demote Taiwan’s embassy to a 
“liaison office.” The Chinese side rejected this suggestion, and thus ended the first round of 
talks.
154
 The second round of negotiation was also held in Beijing. This time, South Korea 
emphasized its precondition for the normalization. The Korean delegation said that since the 
relationship between Taiwan and Korea lasted for a long time, they wanted China to support that 
South Korea could maintain special relations with Taiwan after establishing normalization with 
China. However, China adhered to its original guideline, which demanded South Korea to sever 
all its ties with Taiwan. In the third round of negotiation held in Seoul, South Korea retreated 
from its original position and accepted China’s precondition for the normalization, and both sides 
reached an agreement on the issue.
155
 These three rounds of talks have established both China 
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and South Korea’s agreement to the necessary preconditions for establishing official diplomatic 
ties, thereby offering a final stepping stone towards the 1992 Sino-Korea normalization.       
On August 24, 1992, both China and South Korea’s foreign ministers officially signed 
the communiqué for the establishment of the diplomatic normalization between the two 
countries.
156
 The 1992 normalization was a tangible fruit of over two decades in accumulated 
effort of building cooperation. Since the 1970’s, China-South Korea relations have experienced a 
progressive de-linking process from ideological dogmatism and superpower rivalry that 
dominated much of the previous two decades. Overcoming their long-held ideological tensions, 
South Korea and China both moved towards identifying the benefits of building proactive 
cooperation based on political, economic mutual interests. The three major events during the 
1990s also solidified the two states’ trust and confidence in each other, and ultimately shaped the 
road towards the establishment of diplomatic relations between them. In just forty years since the 
end of the Korean War, they went from being hostile enemy to being close partners. As of today, 
over fifteen years have passed since the two countries established diplomatic relations. During 
that time, this bilateral relation has gone beyond the extent anyone could have imagined. The 
leaders of both countries frequently paid official visits to each other, building further cooperation 
and promising for more exchanges. In 2005, the two-way trade volume reached over $100 billion. 
China, which in 2005 received $2.6 billion of investment from Korea, became Korea’s largest 
investment destination. Korea also became China’s third largest trading partner.
157
 Behind China 
and South Korea’s ongoing success at improving their ties after the diplomatic normalization, 
there is the solid foundation that they laid at the very beginning and throughout their relationship 
in the last four decades. 
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4.4. Rivalry between China and other East Asian Countries and territorial disputes  Soft Power  
Despite the territorial conflict in South China Sea, China maintained its relationship with 
South East Asian countries by increasing its trade partnerships and foreign assistance. In the 
2014 ASEAN Summit, China offers $20 billion in loans in Southeast Asia for regional 
infrastructure development.
158
 With the exerted effort in reaffirming the importance of 
maintaining maritime security in the region, ASEAN member states “agreed to designate the 
year 2015 as the ASEAN-China Year of Maritime Cooperation, welcoming China's 
comprehensive plan for utilizing the ASEAN-China Maritime Cooperation Fund to provide 
financial support for their cooperation in the areas of maritime connectivity, marine science and 
technology, as well as maritime scientific research, search and rescue, disaster management and 
navigation safety.”
159
 This promise between ASEAN member states and China showed that 
political actors agree to the importance of effective cooperation in the region.  
As China was basing its claims on historical information, other ASEAN member states, 
Vietnam and the Philippines in particular, were basing their claims to the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.
160
 According to Fravel, the continued economic growth of 
China was partnered with its stronger military influence. Considering that China’s military was 
considered as the most powerful in the region, the formation of the East Asian Community could 
be the most effective non-military force solution to end the territorial conflict. With the EAC 
alliance, an EAC Commission may handle the disputed territories, where all EAC members 
equally share the resources available in the disputed islands, including research and development. 
Maritime rights would be equally granted to member states. Rather than individual states keeping 
                                                 
158
 Tiezze, Shannon. “China Offers $20 billion in loans to ASEAN”  The Diplomat 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/china-offers-20-billion-in-loans-to-asean/ 15 November 2014.  
159
 Ibid.  
160
 Fravel, Taylor . “Maritime Security in the South China Sea and the Competition over Maritime rights.” Center 
for a New American Security. January 2012.  
 69 
any revenues from the resources of the islands, the EAC commission would be allocating any 
revenues to specific EAC programs or allocate them as emergency funds. In return to this 
peaceful governance of the territories, any member state that needed any financial assistance or 
humanitarian aid due to a natural disaster could request assistance to the EAC Commission.  
Besides the disputed territories in East Asia, China relationship with its neighbors are 
strong with regards to assisting them with foreign aids. Since 1950, China’s very first material 
assistance to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Vietnam, China’s foreign 
aid program has grown both in breadth and depth. China is now regularly providing bilateral 
assistance to 123 developing nations in eight major forms: complete projects, goods and 
materials, technical cooperation, human resource development cooperation, medical teams sent 
abroad, emergency humanitarian aid, volunteer programs in foreign countries, and debt relief.
161 
By the end of 2009, China had provided a total of 256.29 billion RMB ($4.03 billion) in aid to 
foreign countries, including 106.2 billion RMB (41.4%) in grants, 76.54 billion RMB 
(29.9%) in interest-free loans and 73.55 billion RMB (28.7%) in concessional loans.
162  
China’s foreign aid expenditure in 2009 alone was 13,296 million RMB ($2.08 billion).
163
 
By the end of 2009, China had helped developing countries construct over 2,000 
complete projects, run over 4,000 training sessions of different types for 120,000 people 
from developing countries, sent over 21,000 medical workers to treat 260 million patients in the 
recipient countries, provided on nearly 200 occasions emergency aid to foreign countries, 
dispatched to 19 developing countries 405 young volunteers and 7,590 Chinese-language 
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teachers to over 70 countries. China had also signed debt relief protocols with 50 countries, 




The recipients of China’s foreign aid include most developing countries in Asia, Africa, 
Latin America, the Caribbean, Oceania and Eastern Europe. About two-thirds of China's aid 
always goes to the least developed countries and other low-income countries. By the end of 
2009, China had aided 161 countries and more than 30 international and regional organizations, 
including the 123 developing countries that receive aid from China regularly. Of them, 30 are in 
Asia, 51 in Africa, 18 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 12 in Oceania and 12 in Eastern 
Europe. Asia and Africa, home to World’s the largest poor population, have received about 80% 
of China’s foreign aid.
165
 In Asia, in particular, China has provided East Asian countries, such as 
Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines, humanitarian assistance to assist recipient countries 
affected by natural disasters. Major highlights of Chinese foreign assistance for the past five 
years include: counter trafficking of persons and drugs (Laos), elections (Cambodia), and 
historical preservation (Philippines and Cambodia).
166
 China has also financed infrastructure, 
energy-related projects such as hydropower development in Myanmar, railway project in the 
Philippines, steel plants in Thailand and power plant and mining in Vietnam.
167
  
China does see it as its responsibility as a strong nation to help less developed nations. 
Responsibility comes from the help it received from other nations during its development both 
domestically and internationally, and is reinforced by the political benefits, economic benefits 
and soft power it has obtained through aid. China’s soft power will not only strengthen its 
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relationship with its neighbors but also it signifies peaceful development in building an East 
Asian Community.  
4.5 The Cold War Structure  Post-Cold War Structure 
The American-led alliance dubbed as “hub-and-spoke” system and the USSR-influenced 
alliance have underpinned the regional economic/security order during the Cold War. However, 
the post-Cold War East Asia shows undeniable trends that show delinking of Asia from the U.S. 
- (or now dissolved Soviet Union) dominated Cold-War structure. Many significant geopolitical 
changes have taken place including the US withdrawal from Vietnam, Japan’s come-back as a 
major industrial power after World War II, South Korea’s democratization, the Soviet empire’s 
collapse in the early 1990s, and China’s success as a regional and global power. Among these, 
three striking trends have shaped the postwar East Asia in a fundamentally different way from 
the divisive Cold-War structure.  
First and foremost, the region became enormously rich with added political economic 
leverage in the world. As a result, more Asian countries demanded a revamp of the old American 
dominated bilateral economic relations to multilateral relations; the countries argued that the 
‘spoke-economies’ (i.e. American allies in East Asia) had been left at a serious disadvantage by 
the U.S. unilateral pressure from time to time. Asia as a whole has accomplished great economic 
success of catching up with industrialized nations in North America and Europe. In 1960, Asia 
accounted for only 4 - 5 percent of the world Gross National Product (GNP) in contrast with 37 
percent for the U.S., Canada and Mexico combined. Merely three decades later, by the early 90s, 
the combined economies of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the ASEAN countries, and greater 
China took roughly 30 percent of world’s GNP, approximately the same share as that added by 
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North America and Western Europe.
168
 However, East Asia’s rapid economic growth had not 
always been reflected in the subsequent change in the allocation of influence in international 
organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the UN. In order to enhance its collective 
global influence, East Asian countries were increasingly focused on forming an integrated 
regional body instead of relying upon the U.S. through separate bilateral relations. 
Secondly, China’s rapid economic development along with its “peripheral diplomacy” 
helped to advance its image as an attractive partner in the cooperative regional scheme among 
countries in East Asia, rivaling that of America. China’s surging economy can now offer 
substantial economic benefits to America’s important Asian allies. Japan’s rebound after the 
‘lost-decade’ of 1990s was mainly due to its exports to China; amid the sluggish US and 
European economies, China became Japan’s biggest export destination outstripping the U.S. of 
its long-held rank.
169
 In 2007, China also became South Korea’s largest trading partner at trade 
volume of $140.5 billion. South Korea’s exports to China reached $80 billion, making China its 
biggest export destination.
170
 In 2008, China’s trade with Southeast Asian nations topped $192 
billion volume, more than three times the amount exchanged in the U.S-ASEAN trade. With 
China-ASEAN Free Trade Area that took effect in 2010, the trade volume reached an 
unprecedented level as most goods became tariff-free, making it as the third of largest free trade 
agreement.
171
 China’s change in foreign policy also had significant impact on its geopolitical 
image in East Asia. In the early 1990s, China adopted aggressive policy by using military 
strength to intimidate other countries in Asia. The strategy involving sending several naval ships 
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to contested areas in the South China Sea eventually backfired, leading the President of the 




However in 2003, China’s image in the eyes of neighboring governments went through a 
radical change. The new perception was that China was trying its best to assist and accommodate 
its Asian neighbors while the U.S. was perceived as unilaterally setting its own foreign policy 
and strong-arming everyone onto that plan without much consideration of other countries.
173
 
China proposed a “bilateral joint development” model to explore the contested areas in the South 
China Sea for oil with Vietnam and the Philippines. Beijing also signed to the Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation, a document that confirmed the signer’s respect for the sovereignty and equality 
of the ASEAN members. Southeast Asian leaders who traditionally looked for the U.S. as the 




 Thirdly, the region had been more peaceful as conflicts among states in East Asia had 
been ameliorated. The fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s has challenged the ideological 
divide (capitalism versus communism) and left a room for new political thinking. Gradually, 
promotion of economic interests through international trade arose as the new driving force 
shaping international relations in the region. Hence, East Asian countries seen less incentive to 
engage in hostile activities, and as a result the magnitude of political tension was significantly 
reduced compared to those before 1980s. Two examples were quite noteworthy: signs of easing 
tensions between the PRC and Taiwan, and between North and South Korea. After decades of 
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mutual animosity, the Communist Party in Mainland China and the Nationalist Party in Taiwan 
began high-level contact towards reconciliation by having a meeting between President Hu 
Jintao and Chairman Lien Chan in April 2005.
175
 Since then, direct postal, transportation, and 
trade links across the Cross Strait had been established under the name “Three Links” on 
December 2008. In 2009, approximately one million Chinese mainlanders visited Taiwan. 
Currently, there are more than 270 direct flights per week linking the two sides. According to 




There was increasing possibility of peace in the Korean peninsula as well. Although the 
reconciliation progress in Korea was not comparable to that of the Cross Strait relations, both 
North and South Korea began to engage in high-level talks in 2000 including first Inter-Korean 
Summit between Kim Jong- il and Kim Dae-jung.
177
 Since then, family reunions and another 
Inter-Korean Summit followed, reaffirming peace on the peninsula. Despite of some naval 
clashes and North Korea’s nuclear test, there were relatively fewer skirmishes between the two 
sides nowadays compared to the Cold War period. There had been some attempts by both Koreas 
to put aside different ideological beliefs and develop cooperation for common economic benefits. 
A good example was the Kaesong Industrial Park, which opened in December 2004. Located ten 
kilometers north of the Korean Demilitarized Zone, it was the first cooperative project with the 
goal of achieving win-win economic gains for both Koreas. Hyundai Asan, a division of South 
Korean conglomerate Hyundai, had been in charge of developing the industrial park and 
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employed as many as 40,000 DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, i.e. North Korea) 
workers as of 2009, providing much needed employment opportunities. On the other hand, South 
Korean firms benefit from this venture by taking advantage of cheap labor available in the 
North.
178
 Economic motivation could influence even the long-time enemies to shake hands 
together.  
The synergistic connections among these three trends have led East Asia away from the 
disruptive Cold-War alignment and towards an interlinked regional collective arrangement. 
Today, growing number of governmental and quasi-governmental efforts are being made to 
enhance regional ties, and consequently collective peace and prosperity.  
4.6.  The U.S. Opposition   Possible Cooptation of the EAC 
As emphasized in Chapter 4, the U.S. has an important role in the development of an East 
Asian Community as it has extensive political, security and economic relations with many East 
Asian countries. In 1990, during the first George Bush’s administration, U.S. officials strongly 
objected the initial Mahathir proposal for an East Asian Economic Grouping. However, in 2000s, 
U.S’s high-level officials have not voiced out serious concern over the ASEAN+3 process and 
the East Asian dialogue channels accompanying it. I argue three reasons why co-opting the EAC 
might be the best option for the U.S.  
First, the EAC does not plan in promoting protectionist policy, but rather hope to play a 
complementary role to the existing international bodies governing global economy. Even with 
rapidly increasing intra-regional demand and investment by the development of EAC, East Asian 
reliance on final demand from extra-regional markets, most prominently the US market, will not 
subside easily. As the largest or second largest market for the exports of nearly a dozen Asian 
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countries, the U.S .has consistently taken in between 23 and 33 percent of the region’s exports. 
Further, close to 30 percent of U.S. exports enter the ASEAN, South Korea, China, Japan, and 
Taiwan.
179
 If the EAC threatens to become a self-sufficient economic block in the near future, it 
will be an economic suicide. East Asian governments in no way promote inward-looking policies 
as evidenced by the fact that many of them are pursuing FTAs with countries outside the 
region.
180
 As shown by the number of countries currently on the negotiation process for bilateral 
FTAs with the US (e.g. South Korea, Singapore, and Japan), East Asian regionalism values US 
involvement in the region. With open regionalism in mind, the EAC plans to take on regional 
issues, which do not receive serious consideration in the existing global frameworks for 
trade/investment liberalization (WTO) and international financial management (IMF).  
Rather than depending on international bodies / organizations, promoting regional 
economic/financial security lies the root of the EAC idea. Through the EAC, the region as a 
whole also wants to have an independent voice in the global economy, a willpower intensified by 
the widespread opinion of the IMF’s mishandling of the 1997 financial crisis.
181
   
Secondly, there is increasing doubt whether the US has political/economic means to 
oppose the EAC formation process as it did in 1990.  During the 1990s, the U.S. pursued 
‘financial liberalization’ throughout East Asia in order to make the region to be “highly 
dependent on the US dollar for exchange rate stabilization, trade invoicing, external asset 
denomination, foreign exchange reserve holding, and external liabilities.”
182
 One consequence of 
this policy was the massive purchases of US treasury bonds and build-up of huge dollar-
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denominated foreign exchange reserves by many Asian governments. By August 2006, Japan 
($664 billion) was the largest foreign holder of US treasuries, followed by China ($339 billion). 
Exceeding over 1 trillion US dollars in reserves, Japan and China’s total holdings were more 
than three times the combined holdings of Britain, Germany, and Canada ($300 billion).
183
 
Additionally, East Asian governments have been the most important financiers for the U.S. 
campaign of ‘War on Terror’ launched after the 9/11 attack in 2001. The National Priorities 
Project estimated the total costs of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan at around $1.05 trillion by 
counting all Congress- approved funds since the fiscal year 2001.
184
 In October 2007, 
Congressional Budget Office Director, Peter Orszag, stated in his testimony that the ‘War on 
Terror’ may cost up to $2.4 trillion until 2017. This gargantuan sum did not even include the 
Pentagon’s normal fiscal year spending which was about $450 billion in 2007.
185
 In sum, the U.S. 
is the world’s biggest debtor by wide margin with ever-escalating deficits in its current account. 
Growing financial dependence on foreign governments, especially those in East Asia, to cover 
those deficits can necessarily constrain the US ability to directly oppose the multilateral 
negotiations promoting East Asian integration.  
Thirdly, increasing East Asian economic and cultural integration is an inevitable trend at 
least in the near future. Over the next decade, the integration will only accelerate as the trade 
patterns center within the region. As explained in the first chapter, intraregional trade/production 
network has been expanding rapidly since the Plaza Accord of 1985. The exponential rise of 
bilateral free trade agreements between Asian countries serves as conspicuous evidence. 
ASEAN-China FTA came into effect in January 2010, and their bilateral trade volume exceeded 
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 Japan also made multiple Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreements 
with ASEAN countries such as Indonesia, Brunei, Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia, and 
Singapore. South Korea-ASEAN FTA came into effect in June 2007 with most of tariff 
reduction started in 2010.
187
 As East Asia becomes more dependent on intraregional trade and 
consumption, the U.S. influence in the region as the main consumer and trader will gradually 
subside.  
 These three reasons demonstrate how co-opting the development of an East Asian 
Community can be an effective choice for the U.S. Furthermore, the co-option can potentially 
revitalize American public diplomacy in the region by improving its heavily damaged image. It 
can help lessen the growing anti-Americanism fueled by the angry public opinion toward the US-
led financial liberalization during 1990s, its inappropriate response to the 1997 financial crisis, 
and its war on terrorism since 2001. The U.S. should give East Asia the same priority as it does 
to Europe, and it should also facilitate closer interaction between Asian governments. To do so, 
Washington should task U.S. embassies to reinvigorate their cooperation with leading Asian 
cultural, economic, and political organizations. Indeed, U.S. President Obama perhaps 
understands that co-option of an EAC can render Washington in better position to shape the 
future of East Asia. In response to the Japanese Prime Minister Hatoyama’s concept of East 
Asian Community, President Obama said in November 2009 that he looks forward to engaging 
with the East Asia Summit more formally in the future.
188
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Obama’s use of the concept “East Asia Summit (three more members added to the 
ASEAN+3 grouping)” instead of “East Asian Community (ASEAN+3, 13 potential members)” 
is interesting as the former term indicates the addition of three more potential members on top of 
the latter term’s membership; those three members are India, Australia, and New Zealand. 
However, the fact that Obama did not openly challenge the concept of Hatoyama’s EAC 
proposal indicates a possible co-option of the idea from the U.S. 
Conclusion 
 Political challenges play a role in regionalizing the East Asia. The relationship of China 
with its neighbors and the influence of the United States to the major players (Japan and South 
Korea) in the region shape the formation of the East Asian Community. As China becomes a 
regional hegemon, economically and politically, the U.S places a major concern to the role of 
China in maintaining peace in the region, opposing the formation of the EAC. However, based 
on the analysis in this chapter, the political environment have changed over time in East Asia, 
and the political challenges described in this chapter can be overcome by a gradual process of 









5.  What’s Next? 
5.1. Auspicious Signs for the EAC Formation 
Two achievements in state-driven East Asian cooperation stand out as they bring forward 
the development of an East Asian Community. The first one is the explosive growth in number 
of bilateral FTAs between East Asian countries. The idea is that these separate FTAs can support 
the process of negotiating multilateral FTA encompassing the whole East Asia. A simple outline 
towards an EAC looks like this:  
 
Table 2. FTA/EPA Initiatives in East Asia (as of September 2004) 
In effect 





Bangkok Treaty (1976) China–ASEAN China–New Zealand 
Laos–Thailand (1991) Hong Kong–New Zealand China–Australia 
ASEAN FTA (1992) 


















Korea–Singapore (concluded) Korea–ASEAN 
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 Source: Kawai M. “East Asian economic regionalism: Progress and challenges” (2005), Journal of 
Asian Economics, 16 (1), pp. 29-55 
 
Note: From 2005 until March 2010, several new FTAs under official negotiation or study have 
formally came into force: Japan-Malaysia (May 2005), Korea-ASEAN (March 2006), Japan-
Thailand (November 2007), Japan-Philippines (December 2008), China-ASEAN (January 2010), 
and Hong Kong–New Zealand (March 2010). In October 2010 at the APT Summit in Hanoi, 
leaders of APT agreed to consider, review and identify the future of APT cooperation.  
 
Another important achievement towards building an EAC is the extensive bilateral swap 
agreements (BSA) between East Asian countries. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the Chiang Mai 
Initiative (CMI) introduced in May 2000 consisted of multilateral/bilateral currency swap 
agreements among the ten ASEAN members, China, Japan, and South Korea. By October 2009, 
the CMI network included 16 bilateral agreements with amounts totaling $90 billion. The wide-
ranging crisscross pattern of arrangements between ASEAN+3 countries is shown in the image 
below:  
 
China–Hong Kong (January 
2004) 
Singapore–Canada Korea–Mexico 
China–Macao (January 2004) Singapore–Mexico Singapore–Taiwan 
Korea–Chile (April 2004) 











 ASEAN–India  
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Source:  "The Agreement on the Swap Arrangement under the Chiang Mai Initiative (as of October 16, 
2009)" (PDF). Bank of Japan. 16 October 2009. Retrieved April 1, 2010. 
<www.boj.or.jp/en/type/release/zuiji07/data/un0707a.pdf> 
 
On top of the $90 billion swaps, additional $7.5 billion commitments had been made 
under the New Miyazawa Initiative which was a Japanese government initiative to provide short-
term financing facility to the crisis-hit Malaysia, Korea, and the Philippines in 1999.
189
 
Both achievements brought the idea of building a politically/ financially cooperative 
regional body closer to reality. Encouraged by these accomplishments, both China and Japan 
                                                 
189
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have tasked special diplomatic efforts to promote an EAC took off. In September 2003, China 
hosted the first annual conference of the Track II Network of East Asian Think Tanks (NEAT) to 
identify tangible steps to build an EAC. At the 8
th
 ASEAN+3 meeting in Vientiane, Premier Wen 
Jiabao has taken the initiative to launch the feasibility study of the East Asia-wide FTA. He 
indicated that China was ready to financially support a joint study on the potential EAC financial 
and monetary cooperation.
190
 The then newly-elected Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama 
had repeatedly spoken of his determination to shift Japan’s focus from a more America-centric 
foreign policy to a more Asia-focused policy. He was an enthusiastic supporter of deepening 
regional economic integration; he promised to try his best to build an East Asian free trade zone 
by 2020.
191
 He believed that dynamic intra-regional trade in East Asia is crucial to Japan’s long-
term growth strategy. Other leaders in East Asia shared this aspiration. In the fifth ASEAN+3 
Summit in November 2001, the leaders of thirteen nations represented have endorsed the East 
Asian Free Trade Agreement (EAFTA), however with no given goal-year in mind.
192
 The 
challenge lied at converging a proliferate number of bilateral Free Trade Agreements/Economic 
Partnership Agreements existing in the region. Consolidating different trade arrangements 
towards identical rules and common tariff rates will surely not be an easy task.   
5.2 Policy Suggestions for the EAC efforts 
There are three policy suggestions I propose to East Asian leaders to promote the goal of 
establishing an East Asian Community:  
1. Developmental assistance;  
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2. Expansion of regional student exchange program; and  
3. Cooperation for common security concerns.  
First, I argue that the member countries of ASEAN+3 should incorporate institutional 
developmental assistance policy in order to facilitate economic convergence between developed 
and less-developed economies in the region. This policy will be able to help less-developed 
economies to build a capacity to participate in regional arrangement such as an East Asia-wide 
FTA. The European Union has the model called the Common Structural Policies (CSP), which 
accounted for almost one third of the total EU budget in the 2000-2006 periods. The CSP 
includes the European Reconstruction and Development Funds (ERDF) given to countries whose 
GDP per capita is less than 75 percent of the EU average, or that are very remote in terms of 
geographic location, or that have very low population density.
193
 Both the contributing and 
receiving countries of this developmental fund can benefit as the structural aid stimulates the 
whole region’s economic development.
194
 This implies that the more industrialized countries in 
the region such as Japan, Singapore, and South Korea – which will probably be the main 
contributors to the proposed budget – can profit when structural transfers foster economic growth 
and political stabilization in less-industrialized member states in the southern part of East Asia. 
Using GDP per capita measure to determine the aid is probably not apt in the East Asian case 
because it does not accurately capture individual country’s economic power. For example, a big 
economic power like China has even lower figure ($6,500) than that of relatively smaller 
economy like Thailand ($8,000).
195
  Although, the exact method of determining the amount of 
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contribution and aid should be discussed further, the policy can promote more intense economic 
cooperation by closing the economic gap between northern and southern parts of East Asia.   
Secondly, East Asian governments should actively help to expand the intra-regional 
university exchange student programs. These programs can boost intellectual and cultural 
integration among young adults who can be the main drivers of rising East Asian regionalism. 
The European Union student exchange program called the ERASMUS (European Region Action 
Scheme for the Mobility of University Students) Program was established in 1987, and it helped 
over 1.6 million students to carry out a study period at 2,199 higher education institutions abroad 
across thirty-one European countries.
196
 The program has two main features: (1). the program 
guarantees that the study abroad period of at least three months to an academic year in another 
European country is recognized by the student’s original institution; (2). European Commission 
provides funding for student participants so that they do not pay extra tuition fees to the host 
university. Modeled after the ERASMUS program, the Asia-Pacific Association for International 
Education (APAIE) was established by a committee of thirteen countries’ university 
representatives from the Asia-Pacific region on 03 December 2004, at Korea University in Seoul, 
South Korea. The APAIE network aims to facilitate exchanges of courses, professors and 
students among institutions from different universities as well as promoting joint-degree 
programs.
197
 Government leaders should support these exchange student initiatives to foster not 
only intellectual learning and understanding of the host country but also a sense of community 
among students from different countries.  
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Thirdly, the governments of ASEAN+3 should cooperate more vigorously with each 
other on common security concerns. One such concern is securing energy supply. Professor Paul 
Kennedy, the Director of the International Security Studies program at Yale University, 
repeatedly pointed out the buildup of navies in Korea, Japan, China, India, and Indonesia. The 
focus on strengthening naval forces comes partly because these countries want to protect their 
petroleum supply lines from the Persian Gulf.
198
 The increasing budget spending on naval 
projects had made them rising sea powers, and at the same time produced sources of potential 
conflicts. Hence, there should be an installation of hot lines between all top political leaders of 
thirteen East Asian governments so that they can find immediate political/diplomatic solutions 
when one country’s naval ships trespass another country’s territorial waters. Furthermore, the 
governments should foster deeper political connections on other regional security issues such as 
cooperative sea resource explorations, damage control for natural disasters, and cooperative 
efforts to address environmental problems such as global warming that pose serious threat to the 
region.        
5.3. Conclusion 
An Jung-geun’s concept of “Citizen’s Asia” sheds much light upon the positive direction 
for an East Asian community to evolve in the future. A regional organization run and represented 
by civic forces is arguably the greatest form of multilateralism in forming an international body. 
His vision of multilateralism invites leadership from relatively smaller countries like Korea and 
ASEAN nations, and it can dispel much fear about Asia being dominated either by China or 
Japan. After Kim young-ho finished his lecture in Tokyo, a former Japanese ambassador to the 
United Nations came up to him and said: “When China or Japan come out talking about an Asian 
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community, everyone guards against it. It becomes more of a possibility if it is Korea who brings 
up the idea, and if Korea promotes An Jung-geun’s vision.”
199
 Korea’s role in building an East 
Asian community has already been noted in Korean President Kim Dae-jung’s proposal to 
establish the East Asia Vision Group and the East Asia Study Group in December 1998 and 
November 2000 respectively. Eminent intellectuals from the 13 ASEAN+3 countries participate 
in two groups, and each year they submit reports to ASEAN+3 Summit on implementable 
concrete measures for establishing an EAC, reasons for their selection, and their expected 
benefits.
200
 In addition to Korea, ASEAN has also taken a leading role in the East Asian 
institutionalization via the ASEAN+3 process that began in 1999. Similar to Brussel’s role in the 
EU, ASEAN has increasingly become a neutral broker between East Asia’s giants, and help 
countries to come together to address common concerns.    
With the help of power-balancing roles of Korea and the ASEAN, the idea of an EAC has 
made substantial progress over a decade to become “open” multilateral regional body. As I have 
argued in Chapter 3 “Economic needs realized in the post-crisis East Asia,” the economic crisis 
of 1997 solidified political concerns about the regional financial security, and intensified state 
desires to form an organization that can supplement the bottom-up groundwork of 
trade/production/investment networks in the region. In the words of one: “The contours of post-
financial crisis regionalism are, by state design, aimed at restoring to Asia a greater degree of 
political power and autonomy vis-à-vis the rest of the world, and the U.S. and the international 
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financial institutions it controls, in particular.”
201
 However, it seems unlikely to expect that a 
more mature East Asian arrangement will materialize in the immediate future. Even the strongest 
supporters of the EAC admit that East Asian regionalism is at a modest infant stage of 
development; it still faces many obstacles, and it can take several different paths along the way. 
One increasing possibility is that the Community may include three more countries albeit not of 
East Asian origin: India, Australia, and New Zealand. The grouping (i.e. ASEAN+3 plus India, 
Australia, and New Zealand) started its official forum with the name “the East Asian Summit 
(EAS)” in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia on December 14, 2005. The EAS was more enthusiastically 
promoted by Japan and some ASEAN states to circumvent a Sino-centric regional dominance. 
The concept of East Asian Community thus has come to have two groupings both overlapping 
one another. However, the EAC idea had its new beginning when both China and India declared 
on November 2006 that the community would arise through a two-phase process with ASEAN+3 
as the first and the EAS as the second phase.
202
 
Whatever geographical boundaries the East Asian Community will have, the real 
challenge is how to establish an effective regional institution. Since the 1997 financial crisis, East 
Asian governments have shown increasingly strong political will to create such an institution. 
Many people still evince strong doubt that an EAC will ever arise. However, regardless of what 
grouping it will first follow, I believe that the political will towards building an East Asian 
Community will be more robust as times go because there is a clear economic logic for 
strengthening regional frameworks – it helps the on-the-ground trade/investment integration and 
develops new methods of regional financial management. The large benefits of further economic 
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integration and its institutionalization greatly outweigh the political costs of not doing so. By 
implementing various norms, rules, and procedures that fit regional conditions, an East Asian 
Community will greatly contribute to the welfare of East Asia and help one cohesive voice of 
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